The following images were sent to me by the pseudonymously named photographer Victor Lacroix, and show documents captured by the YPG, operating near Ras al Ein, from Jabhat al-Nusra.  It includes images from three administrative documents showing weapons distributed, a register of Syrian fighters, and a register of foreign fighters.   Full translation of these documents can be found here.






This first document contains a list of weapons, ammo, and equipment distributed to Jabhat al-Nusra fighters.  Whoever has been filling this in has been rather inconsistent with the details they are providing, with page 7 listing the exact type of weapon in the "Kind of Weapon" field, while pages 8 and 9 only lists the serial number.  It also lists a number of unusual names for the weapons, such as ashrawiya, sarookh, etc.  My translator contacted a number of former Syrian army soldiers, who told him they were mostly names used for variants of the AK-47

Ashrawiya: literally: of ten = AK-47 with the number 10 carved on its side.
Sarookh: literally: rocket =    AK-47 with a rocket-like shape carved on top of the weapon.
German: = AK-47 with a folding stock to the side (the stock is bent to the side of the weapon, not under it)
Naqeera (or maybe faqeera): very unusual name, maybe used by non-Syrians
Swaqi: very unusual name, maybe used by non-Syrians

You'll also note the first names of the men receiving the weapons as followed by names such as al-Ansari and alTunisi.  These appear to be references to where they are from, so al-Tunisi would be Tunisia, al-Ansari is a Syrian, al-Jazrawi is Iraqi, etc.  It seems likely al-Tamimi and al-Shummari refer to tribal names that extend across various borders.

The next set of documents are registers of foreign and local Jabhat al-Nusra fighters.  Translated versions of these documents can be found here






This lists the name of the member, including where they are from, the date they joined, their speciality, marital status, financial status, their health, and additional notes.  We can see there's a mix of fighters from Tunisia, Bahrain, Turkey, Iraq, and Syria, with a variety of specialities from baking, car bombs, nursing, Sharia law, and media expertise.  About a quarter of the men are married, and the majority appear to have "bad" finances.

Thanks to Aaron Zelin, Pieter Van Ostaeyen, and Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi for help with this piece.

You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com

Long term readers of the blog may remember that throughout 2012 I was tracking evidence of a type of DIY weapon being used by the Syrian air force widely described as a barrel bomb.  Anyone familiar with videos coming from Syria will be very familiar with the term "barrel bomb", a term that has been used to describe both conventional military bombs, such as the OFAB 100-120, and the DIY barrel bombs, which has led to a certain amount of confusion.

DIY barrel bombs were first recorded in late August 2012, and were generally metal barrel, pipes, etc, filled with explosives and frequently shrapnel, and dropped from the back of Mil Mi-8/Mi17 transport helicopters.   When I originally investigated these munitions there was a lot debate other whether or not the Syrian air force would use improvised explosive devices as weapons, with even one commentator describing the idea as "Barrel bomb baloney", but eventually videos emerged showing a helicopter crew throwing DIY barrel bombs out the rear of a helicopter, and footage from Taftanaz air base showing DIY barrel bombs in storage after it was overrun by opposition forces.

One flaw with these DIY barrel bombs is they all appeared to be detonated using a simple wick fuse, like lighting a stick of dynamite.  The problem with this is if the wick is too short the munition will detonate mid-air, and if it's too long there's a chance the bomb will be smash to pieces before it detonates.

Over the past few months I've been in contact with Richard Lloyd, Warhead Technology Consultant at Tesla Laboratory Inc, and among the various topics we've been discussing, he's highlighted a number of videos that show what appear to be unusually large explosions, and what appears to be DIY barrel bomb being dropped from helicopters that appear much larger than ones we've seen in the past.

Videos have now been posted from the town of Kafr Zita, Hama that appear to confirm the theory that larger DIY barrel bombs have now been deployed



Both videos show large DIY barrel bombs that have failed to detonate.  The second video shows one that appears to have partly exploded, peeling back the thick metal, but what's very interesting is the design of the DIY barrel bomb in the first video.

As I mentioned before, one flaw with the barrel bomb was the wick fuse causing problems with detonation.  The large DIY barrel bomb in the first video instead appears to have an impact fuze, which is removed from the munition




It appears there might have possibly been two impact fuzes, probably because of the broad front end (something also seen in munitions for the opposition's Hell Cannon), and a lack of aerodynamics to ensure the bomb lands right on the tip of it's nose.  That lack of aerodynamics has been partly addressed by whoever put this bomb together by the addition of tail fins


Richard Lloyd believes this would have been able to carry 1250-1750 lbs (approx 565-795kg) of explosive, and suggests the tail fins wouldn't have been very effective because of that.  What this does show is the Syrian Air Force is deploying huge DIY bombs, and they are attempting to make the fuzes far more effective than previous model.

You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com

Regular readers of the blog will be familiar with two weapons used by pro-government forces known as IRAMs (Improvised Rocket Assisted Munitions) and UMLACAs (Unidentified Munitions Linked to Alleged Chemical Attacks), both of which I've written a number of articles on.  At it's most basic, and IRAM is an artillery rocket that's had the standard warhead removed, and replaced by a much larger warhead, and in Syria these have been launched from single barrel stand launchers, and four barrel truck mounted launchers (pictured below)

Yesterday, a video was published online by the website Al-hadath News showing the type of munition used in the August 21st Sarin attack being launched from Qadam Railway Station


There's two minor points to note about this video, and one major point.  At the start of the video, the cameraman describes the weapon as a "Volcano rocket".  As I noted earlier this week, the "Volcano rocket" is a named used for both this weapon, and smaller IRAM-type weapons used by government forces.  It seems now, we finally have a name for this weapon.

The other minor point is about the flag on the truck.  It's not a great shot of the flag, but some people have noted the white circle on a black background looks a lot like the flag used by various Jihadist groups in Syria.  As this photograph of the National Defence Force shows, it's not just Jihadists who use that particular colour scheme


Those are both minor points, but what's extremely unique and important about this video is it shows the impact of the rocket followed by the sound of the explosion.  The detonation is at around 17.5s, and the noise of the explosion can be heard around 23.5s, so that's a delay of around 6 seconds.  The speed of sound at around the altitude is around 337 m/s, so that would mean the range of the munition is around 2022 meters.

I showed this video to Richard Lloyd, who has been studying the munitions used in the August 21st Sarin attack closely, and based on the available evidence, he concluded that the munition was launched at around a 21 degree angle, with a range of around 2.1km.  That reminded me of another video showing the launch and impact of a Volcano, this time fired from Mezzeh airbase


While the impact isn't visible, it appears the flight time is around 20-22 seconds, several seconds longer than the other video.  Richard Lloyd believes that the longer flight time would point to a higher angle of launch, and a longer range.  Based off the two videos Richard Lloyd believes a range of 2-2.5km is reasonable for the Volcano rocket.  That's not to say the maximum range is definitely 2.5km, just that based of available evidence that's a reasonable estimation.

Thank to the UN report we have an idea of the direction the rockets came from, and a recent Al Jazeera Arabic documentary about the August 21st attack might even provide more information


In the film they present what they claim is more evidence from the attack, including two previously unseen Volcano rockets (bringing the total recorded to 8), and what they claim is the azimuths for those two rockets


With the UN report, that's three azimuths, 285, 290, and 307 degrees.  We also know the exact impact location of two of the Volcanoes used in the attack (details here and here).  Given that information, I've put together a map that shows the possible area of origin for the attack based of the possible ranges (click to expand)




What's interesting about this range and the azimuth, is it puts the possibly launch locations inside an area that was part of the Syrian Army's "Operation Qaboun", which was heavily covered by ANNA News.  Their first video was posted on June 24th, with the last video posted on August 20th.  It covered the attempts by the Syrian army to fight their way through a district between Qaboun and Jobar, which would act as a staging point for attacks later on in the year.  Videos posted by ANNA News establish that the Syrian military were operating, and based, inside that area, for example this video from August 5th showing at the bus station to the east of the area


At 1:54 in the below video, filmed on August 10th, you can see the mosque just west of the tank base in the area


Open Source IMINT took a very detailed look at videos posted by ANNA News showing fighting in the area from September onwards, and it shows that region now being used to launch attacks both to the north and the south


After the August 21st attack Storyful collected data on various claims about the impact locations of rockets used in the attack, including the claims by the local LCCs about the impact locations of each rocket.  All the positions were plotted onto a map, with the impact locations reported by the LCC marked in light blue.  According to that map, all the impact locations are within 2.5km of the area controlled by the Syrian army.

So from all this information we can conclude that the Syrian military would have been capable of launching the August 21st Sarin attack, despite the short range of the Volcano rockets.

You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com

Earlier today I came across the following video, posted on the Eretz Zen YouTube channel, featuring Saddam al-Jamal, the former leader of the Supreme Military Council of the Free Syrian Army's Eastern Front, who recently joined the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham.  In this clip he details foreign involvement with the Syrian opposition


The above video is just part of a a much longer 30 minute long video recorded by the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, which can be found here.  I've had the complete video translated, with some duplicate lines and statements removed for brevity's sake.

Revealing the biggest conspiracy to target our brethren in ISIS
Confessions of leaders and officers of Liwa Ahfad Al Rasoul
Grandsons of the prophet brigade
0:24 What about the support given by some western and Arab countries to the Staff Board, the military council and the Syrian Coalition?
0:32 Is this support free? Only to help Syrians get rid of tyrant Assad? What about the closed meetings in Ankara between highest leaders of the FSA and the Arabic and Western Intel?
0:51 What are their goals and plans?
0: 56 What’s the reason behind this fervent media campaign by the agent TV channels against the ISIS?
1:05 All these questions and others will be answered by Saddam al Jamal, the former revolutionary leader of the Eastern Front in the Staff Board, and leader of Liwa Allah Akbar of the Ahfad al Rasoul, which is one of the biggest brigades in eastern Syria.
1:28 After he discovered this plot against Islam and Muslims and the ISIS.
1:39 He surrendered to the ISIS and disclosed info of plans made by the infidel West and some treacherous Arab countries against theproject of Al Ummah, the Nation.

2:04 Part Two
2:06 In the name of God, most gracious, most merciful. My name is Sddam al Jamal, the former revolutionary leader of the Eastern Front in the Staff Board, and leader of Liwa Allah Akbar of the Ahfad al Rasoul. I declare my dissociation from the Staff Board and the Military Council and the Syrian Coalition, and my dissociation from the general leader of Grandsons of the Prophet Brigades, Major Maher Noaimi, and from Ragheb al-Tohma, leader of Ahfad al Rasoul in Deir Ezzor. And I declare my repentance, and I do not fear from Allah any blame. I address a call to my brethren in the FSA to dissociate themselves from the military councils, the Staff Board and the [Syrian] Coalition, which call them to fight our brethren the Islamists and to prevent the Sharia of Allah from being established in the land.
2:55 How were you offered to join the conglomerate of Ahfad al Rassoul?
3:07 When the Staff Board was formed, we met Maher [Noami] there, in Turkey. It was suggested to form the conglomerate of al Ahfad, and that it will receive support. You know, support given to the FSA was little, so we were looking for someone to supply us with arms and ammo. Based on this we, and Liwa al Umma- The Nation Brigade-and Qua’qua’ joined [the Ahfad].
3:30 What’s the goal behind forming this conglomerate?
3::34 Originally, the Ahfad was meant to be part of the FSA, without any agenda or [political] ambitions, and that it would be supported without any return, only to fight the Assad regime. However, we discovered later that this project has an agenda and long-term objectives. Obviously it is supported by Qatar.
4:06 Who are the intel that sponsored this project?
4: 10 It's Qatari. In general, all the intelligence services of the world were participating in the project of the FSA.
4:20 Can you name those intel services?
4: 20 Jordanian intel, Saudi intel, Emirati intel, and Qatari intel. And, obviously, Western intel services are also present.
4:33 Can you name the Western intel?
4: 35 Obviously, the US, Britain, France, those are the main intel services present in the meetings of the Staff [Board] and the Military Councils.
4:50 Is al Ahfad exclusively funded by Qatar?
4:51 At the beginning of the Syrian revolution, the file was handled by Qatar. After a while, they switched to Saudi Arabia, under the claim that Qatar no longer wants to support the Muslim Brotherhood since they are a failed project in Syria.So, the Saudi intelligence services took over the file during the last period of the Syrian revolution. Obviously, the main goal of this project is to fight the Islamists in the Sham and preventing establishing of Sharia, though they wouldn’t openly declare this. The project was prepared for a later period, till it materialize through supporting it with money and ammunition.
6:00 Did they offer you huge sums of money?
6:01 Sure, they fund the Staff Board, who then distribute money to the battalions and brigades.
6:07 Can you give an estimate of this money?
6:10 Recently, the Staff Board was offered a sum of 450,000 USD in the form of relief aid, as far as I know, it was paid by the USA. The money was later distributed to the battle fronts, to the leader of the military council and the leader of the revolutionary council. The money was split between these two councils.
6:47 Who has given you the shipment of arms and ammo lately?
6:50 A first lieutenant of the Staff Board, I remember his name was Haitham.
7:13 After receiving the last arms shipment, did you meet with them?
7:14 Yes, we held many meetings, especially after the latest disputes between Ahfad al Rassoul and ISIS. We were ignorant of the [project] as we didn’t know that we were infidels and apostates after we used to meet with the apostates of Qatar and Saudi Arabia and with the infidels of Western nations such as America and France in order to receive arms and ammo or cash.
7:47 What was the main discussion point in those meetings with the intelligence services?
7:46 The meetings were dominated by showing blind confidence in the FSA. The most frequent question by the intelligence services was: why are you growing this beard. I replied that this a sunnah of our prophet Muhammad. They wanted to know other reasons. Qatari and American intel were present in those meetings.
8:16 Did they ask those kind of questions during the meeting or after it?
8:20 They asked those questions in front of everyone in the meeting. They also ask why we shave the mustache.
8:35 Did they ask other questions?
8:38 They asked why we are fighting Bashar, what objectives we have. We answered that after the fall of Bashar, we will give up arms and return to normal life.
9:00 What were the main questions?
9:01 All of the above, besides asking whether there was any presence of the Islamists and the extremists or the terrorists. They wanted to know if there were foreign fighters in Deir Ezzor. We denied this presence, but it looks like they knew of it and they would tell us that they knew about foreign fighters, maybe they got this info through their spies.
9:42 What intelligence that used to focus on these questions?
9:45 American and Saudi, all of them ask the same questions, even the Jordanian.
9:53 Did they ask you separately?
10: 00 Somewhat, but they were not secret meetings.
10:10 Did they ask you openly to fight the Islamists?
10:13 Those countries, especially Saudi Arabia, give weapons and ammo to to a faction that controls a certain area, only to make sure that the Islamists don’t take it over. Their arch enemy is Islam and Sharia.
10:54 Does this mean that they declared their rejection of establishing Sharia?
10:58 Yes, then how do you explain supplying and funding the FSA while denying it to Al Nusra Front and ISIS? They do know that ISIS would establish Sharia.
11:17 Tell us about the last meeting.
11:18 The last meeting included all the FSA leaders in the east areas, Hasaka, Raqqa and Deir Ezzor, as well as the leaders of Aleppo front, They held meetings with each front separately, eastern and northern, on the first and second days. On the third they met with both fronts in a single meeting, which was sponsored by Prince Salman.
12:03 Whos is Prince Salman?
12:05 Prince Salman occupies the position of Saudi Deputy Defense Minister, and he is currently responsible for the Syrian file, I told you before that Qatar was responsible, but he took over the file from them. Of course, Prince Salman is known as the brother of Prince Bandar [bin Sultan] of the house of Saud. Those present include the Jordanian, Qatari, and Emirati intelligence services as well as Salim Idriss. There were no international intel services that were not present. Maher Noami, Muhannad Tallaa’ and Muhammad Abboud, Jabhat al Asala wa al Tanmiya was also present.
12:54 What did Prince Salman ask you?
12:57 He asked all the attendees in general to …………
13:03 Did he ask you openly to fight the Islamists?
13:05 On the first day he asked those who have plans to attack Assad positions to present their needs of arms, ammo and money. There was a plan to take full control of the eastern area, just to deny those areas to the Islamists. The suppliers did not openly say this, but they insisted that we capture almost all eastern Syria, including oil fields. They asked us to organize ourselves, select a leadership, set up training camps, and pay regular salaries. They asked that all FSA factions unify under the umbrella of the Revolutionary Council or the Military Council.
14:58 What did Salim Idriss say during this meeting?
15:00 He said that the Prince [Salman] had come to support us and supply us with ammo and money, and that he wants the various factions to unite under the umbrella of the Staff Board, and without any other names or labels, in which case all countries will support us.
15:37 What did Ragheb Tohme said during this meeting?
15:40 He was commander in the city [of Deir Ezzor] He also has close ties with Ahmed Jarba, chief of the Coalition prior to the forming of the Coalition, and he received support from Jarba. For me, I had never any contacts with the Coalition or its head Jarba. Prior to the dispute between ISIS and Al Ahfad, Yaser al Qate, Firas Kharaba, Iyad Kharaba, and Walid Shadad got a phone call from Ragheb Tohme to go and meet him in Turkey. They went and he paid 3-5 m SYP. Jarba had already gave 150,000 USD to Tohme, but I don’t know about what happened else during their meeting in Turkey. After they came back from Turkey, problems started to appear in Deir Ezzor.
17:05 Can you say that Jarba was behind the problems in Deir Ezzor?
17:07 I told you Jarba and Tohme have close ties, and Jarba is the favourite man in Syria by Saudi Arabia, Prince Salman and the international intel, he even lacks any [university] degrees and he was imposed on everyone without getting anyone’s approval.
17:32 What do you know about the Raqqa plan?
17:30 It was planned to deploy 500 fighters to liberate it from Salmiya to Raqqa.
17:45 Do this mean they planned to target ISIS in Deir Ezzor?
17:50 Sure, their original objective was to liberate AL Raqq [of ISIS] and continue along the line. Ragheb Tohme knew of this plan, and this is why he recalled them to Turkey and gave them money. When the problem started, Maher phoned and asked us to help [al Ahfad]. The relationship with them worsened after this, and later Maher asked why we did not help al Al Ahfad, I replied that I didn’t know the Ahfad in Raqqa. I said to him also that I was in Raqqa 5 days prior to the problem, and knew well the basis of the problem, namely, ISIS found alcohol in one of the al Ahfad’s vehicles.
The second reason of the problem was that Al Ahfad fighters stopped one of the ISIS’s members at a checkpoint, he was accompanied by a woman who was wearing niqab. Ahfad fighters asked that the woman remove the niqab. After we refused to help al Ahfad, I started receiving angry calls from ….. and he threatened that we will be dismissed by Al Ahfad’s leadership, I then replied that this does not matter to me, let them dismiss us, let them say I am with Qaeda.
The following day he phoned me and said that we didn’t support him and let him down, and he vowed to fight ISIS even alone. I replied that this is not of my business. He added that he will set up a training camp in Turkey and offered to give us support if we join him, and that he will train the fighters and form Special Forces. For me, if in the future some faction will fight ISIS, it will be the Special Forces.
21:25 Will there be a new shipment of arms in this period?
21:27 The countries said that the last shipment was only to boost the morale, but in the coming days a bigger shipment will arrive.
21:35 What kind of weapons they said they would send?
21:42 They always promised to send anti-aircraft missiles, but they sent none, all they sent was 14,5 mm anti-aircraft guns, shoulder fired OSA anti-armor and anti-personnel grenades.
22:09 Who will receive the next arms shipment?
22:15 As far as I know, the shipment would be sent by America and France and Western countries in general, but nobody will receive it. Those countries want to give the weapons to fighters that they call the right hands, ie, fighters who will be trained abroad. They will not give it to any faction inside Syria. They want to receive 25-50 fighters and train them abroad, without disclosing the location of the training camp, whether it was Turkey or Jordan. And when they ask for fighters for training, they at first ask for full information on them, starting from his birth date and so on. They have been asking for this info for the last 9 months.
23:06 Did they ask you this?
23:07 Yes, they did.
23:09 What did they ask exactly?
23:11 When we asked for anti-aircraft missles, and night-vision goggles, they replied to send them, saying that we give these weapons to select elite troops only, after we train them outside Syria. We will then hand them those weapons as well as night-vision snipers and modern anti-armor missiles.
23:50 Are there any FSA fighters who are being trained outside Syria?
23:52 Yes, the FSA, of course, especially from southern Syria. I know since I was in the Staff Board. In Ghouta, Damascus and Dara’a, many groups got trained in Jordan at the hands of the Jordanian intelligence services and Western ones. Everyone knows that when we say Jordan this means Israeli intelligence services. Israel is present in Jordan. All people know that. The media activist Abdu Abu Yazan was ordered by Maher Noami to appear on Al Arabiya TV channel and speak against ISIS, and say that ISIS attacked the FSA and Al Ahfad, which is contrary to the truth. Now he is on the ISIS’s wanted list. Everyone knows that ISIS found alcohol with the Ahfad in Raqq.
The Staff Board held a meeting, Feras Kharaba and Bashir Tohmeh were present, and they discussed the subject of the fight between ISIS and the FSA, especially in Deir Ezzor, Ragheb al Bashir stood up in the meeting. Jarba, head of the Coalition was present in the meeting. They wanted to know if there was a reliable faction that can fight ISIS in the eastern area, and it was suggested that this faction will receive all kinds of support. At this point, Ragheb stood up and said that he, along with Feras Kharaba, are ready to fight ISIS. Feras told them during the meeting that he had 300 fighters. He also told them that they would be able to face ISIS if they convinced Saddam to join them.
26:21 Do you mean that Ahfad started the dispute and problems in Raqqa and Deir Ezzor?
26:23 Yes, they did, In Deir Ezzor the same persons, namely, Feras Kharaba got orders from Ragheb al Tohme, aka Abu Bashir, to start the problem with ISIS. In the last meeting, which was attended by FSA leaders, and headed by Abu Furqan, who is a retired General in the Turkish Intelligence, he said that we have credible information that ISIS is related to Bashar Assad. At first, many people got convinced by this claim.
28:04 This is the devilish plan to target ISIS, through convincing the FSA that it is part of Assad regime and must be fought.
29:30 It’s an honor to come to ISIS and show repentance.
30: 55 Saddam, how did you think of ISIS before repenting and surrendering yourself?
31: The world and Military Council always told us that ISIS are terrorists and takfiris.
31:12 After surrendering yourself, what do you say about these claims?
31:14 After Allah granted me the honor of repentance, I found that all these claims are false and baseless. The treatment I received here is unbelievable, and they considered me more than a brother, and treated my according to the Sharia.

Released on November 23, 2013

You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com

Hamish de Bretton-Gordon, Former Commander UK CBRN Forces and COO SecureBio, examines the many issues the international community now faces in their attempts to destroy Syria's chemical weapons.

Syria's Deputy Foreign Minister Faisal Mekdad has told the BBC his government needs the international community to provide military equipment, to help transport their chemical weapons out of the country. Mr Mekdad was attending an Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons meeting in The Hague.

The Assad Regime is required under the auspices of the UN Security Council to remove all chemical agent and the most toxic precursors about 630 tonnes in total from Syria by 31 Dec 13 and the less toxic precursors, around 700 tonnes by Feb 14.  There appear to be 3 phases to the plan, firstly, to move the 1330 tonnes to the Port of Latakia, secondly to transport these chemicals to the MV Cape Ray presumably in the Mediterranean somewhere, and to commercial toxic waste destruction facilities and finally to destroy the most toxic by hydrolysis on the MV Cape Ray and the rest by normal convention toxic waste destruction at civilian facilities, by mid 2014 – all possible, well apparently, until yesterday’s 11th hour request by Minister Mekdad.

It is understood that most of the CW is North of Damascus and will have to move through a number of contested areas before it reaches Latakia.  Sigrid Kaag head of the UN/OPCW in Damascus admitted on Sat 30 Nov 13 on BBC World Service that the route to the Port is currently blocked.  It is the Regimes responsibility to deliver the CW, as per the CWC, to the Port whence it will be loaded onto ships to become the responsibility of the International Community under supervision of, and verification by the OPCW.

Phase 1 planning for the movement to the Port is an extremely complex military operation with many factors which must be worked through in finite detail, from force protection, to logistics, communications, capabilities required and many alternative options if things go wrong.  Ideally, it would take a sophisticated military like the US or UK many days and weeks with great expertise to plan such an operation.  One of the initial stages of military planning is working out whether you have enough ‘Troops to Task’ or forces available, to achieve the mission.  It would appear at the 11th hour, rather than the First or Second, that the Regime planners have decided they do not have the ‘Troops for the Task’ and now require the International Community to supply, presumably Tanks, armoured personnel carriers etc in order to be able to achieve the mission.  Even if the International community was minded to supply this hardware there is no way it could be handed over the Regime and trained on in order to deliver the CW to the Port by 31 Dec 13.  But surely the UN and OPCW have been intermittently involved in this planning and this would be apparent at the outset, or are the Regime only involving them [UN/OPCW] when it is convenient?

It is also, I suggest, too late to get UN or Coalition troops on the ground in Syria to support such a Mission, even if the International Community was ‘minded too,’ which it does not appear to be.  US or UK units who prepare to do to places like Afghanistan usually conduct about 6 months pre-deployment training before going, and we are now in the under 3 weeks bracket.  Of course US and UK have very high readiness forces but they still have to meet theatre entry standards of training and equipment and an absolute minimum would be around a 4 week flash to bang.  Special Forces like the SAS or Navy Seals/Delta could be used but they are not really equipped for what is conventional force activity in this case.

SO WHAT? Is this an attempt by the Regime to buy time or are they setting up the Mission for failure, and planning to blame the International Community for not providing the appropriate support?  Some see Assad’s use of Sarin in Ghouta on 21 Aug 13 as a brilliant ‘ruse of war’.  Initially it was believed, [and by the Opposition, most of them] that the US was going to ‘blast’ Assad off the planet with Cruise Missiles around the 27 Aug 13; but we are now in a position where the International Community is being held to ransom by the Assad’s Chemical Weapons.  And this is a position which I expect the Regime would like to proliferate, and this request for ‘undeliverable’ military hardware appears to be just that -  A stalling tactic.

If this is the case and the Regime really do not believe that they can achieve their mission without the military hardware, the Opposition in all its guises must guarantee safe passage of the CW to the Port.  Because it is only once the CW is out of Syria that  it [CW] stops becoming the Regimes bargaining piece with the International Community and all can focus on Peace at Geneva 2 on 22 Jan 14.  If the CW is still in Syria on 22 Jan 14 what hope for Geneva 2?

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You can follow SecureBio on Twitter, and listen to Hamish de Bretton-Gordon on BBC Radio 4's The World Tonight talking about chemical weapon issues in Syria.

Thanks to Chris Kabusk for sending me the following 3D models of Volcano rockets and their launchers.

IRAM Volcanoes (videos here)

UMLACA Volcanoes (videos here)

Detail on UMLACA Volcanoes

Volcano Launchers (videos here)

Volcano Launchers

Large Volcano Launcher (video here)

Test picture including Hell Cannon and ammo

A guest post by Olly Morton and Hamish de Bretton-Gordon of SecureBio.

Figure 1 - Prominent Syrian CBR production facilities

Figure 2 - Chemical attacks since Dec 2012

Figure 5: “Message from Kurdish Mujahideen from the Islamic State.” ISIS video of Kurdish fighters in Syria, speaking in Kurdish, not Arabic.

Figure 6: “Statement of the Liberation Front of Qamishli if God wills.”

Figure 7: Ansar al-Khilafa tank operating in the Qamishli area as part of the new offensive announced in October.

Figure 8: Ansar al-Khilafa fighters celebrate victory over the dead corpse of a regime fighter killed amid the claimed capture of the Abu Qusayeb checkpoint in Qamishli area. From late June

Figure 9: One of the logos used by Liwa Amjad al-Islam, a battalion primarily based in Aleppo governorate that has also deployed fighters for the Qamishli front as part of the October offensive.

Figure 10: ISIS and Ahrar ash-Sham flags side-by-side in al-Hawal, Hasakah province, on the border with Iraq.

Figure 11: A Sootoro emblem, associated with the “Syriac Protection Office” of the city of Qamishli.

Figure 12: Sootoro militiamen in a Qamishli street. Note the regime flag on the building.

Figure 13: Sootoro militiamen in Qamishli.

Figure 14: Syrian regime flag in the Qamishli Sootoro’s Protection Office.

Figure 15: The Mar Malki Church in the Qamishli countryside, burnt down in September.

Figure 16: Qamishli Sootoro statement in late October denying formation of new branches in al-Malikiya, al-Qahtaniya and al-Hasakah.

Khan al-Assal

In July, Russia provided the UN with a 100-page report on their own investigation into the chemical attack in Khan al-Assal on March 19th 2013.  While the report was not published, key findings were detailed by the Russian Foreign Ministry when the report was submitted, and also reiterated in an October statement by H.E. Ambassador Vitaly Churkin, Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations

It was established that on March 19 the rebels launched an unguided "Basha'ir-3" projectile towards Khan al-Assal controlled by the Government forces. As you know, 26 people were killed (16 of them were military personnel), 86 injured and intoxicated to different levels.
The results of the analysis clearly indicate that the ordnance used in Khan al-Assal was not industrially manufactured and was filled with sarin. The sarin technical specifications prove that it was not industrially manufactured either. The absence of chemical stabilizers in the samples of the detected toxic agents indicates their relatively recent production. The projectile involved is not a standard one for chemical use. Hexogen utilised as an opening charge is not used in standard ammunitions.
Therefore, there is every reason to believe that it was the armed opposition fighters who used chemical weapons in Khan al-Assal.
According to the information at our disposal, the production of "Basha'ir-3" unguided projectiles was started in February 2013 by the so-called "Basha'ir al-Nasr" brigade affiliated with the Free Syrian Army.

Not only did the Russian's claim it was a DIY rocket fired by the Syrian opposition, but even the specific type, "Basha'ir-3", and the group involved, the "Basha'ir al-Nasr" brigade.  One would assume that as this claim is being made in relation to the 100-page report presented to the UN, the teams investigating the Khan al-Assal attack would be fully aware of the details on those rockets, which are incredibly specific.  However, in the final report the picture is somewhat less clear

The United Nations Mission received contradicting information as to how chemical weapon agents were delivered in the Khan Al Asal incident. Witness statements collected by the UNHRC Commission of Inquiry, provided to the United Nations Mission, supported the position by the Syrian Arab Republic that a rocket was fired from the neighborhood. However, according to other witness statements to the UNHRC Commission of Inquiry, an overflying aircraft had dropped an aerial bomb filled with Sarin.
The United Nations Mission was not able to collect any primary information or any “untouched” artifacts relevant to the incident and necessary for an independent verification of the information gathered. 

The United Nations Mission received from the Government of the Russian Federation its report of the results of the analysis of samples obtained from Khan Al Asal from 23 to 25 March 2013, which identified Sarin and Sarin degradation products on metal fragments and in soil samples taken at the site of the incident.

For me, the question I have now is why the big difference between the UN report and the Russian report about which munition was used?  It seems the type remains of the munition would be the best possible evidence of who was responsible, especially if the Russian's were able to figure out the exact type of munition, and which group uses them.  If Russia had that level of detail, why is the UN report unclear on whether or not it was even a rocket that was responsible?  It's also very interesting that the UN report also states

The team was open, however, to receiving any biomedical samples previously collected by the Syrian Government, which the United Nations Mission would authenticate through DNA tests.
No biomedical samples were handed over to the United Nations Mission by the Syrian Government.

So why did the Syrian Government fail to keep what would have been key evidence in the investigation?  Either way, it seems that the Russian's must have the best possible evidence of opposition responsibility, and with the UN report failing to concur with their results, it's time that the Russian government publishes at least that part of their findings to clear up the discrepancies between the reports.

Saraqeb and Sheikh Maqsoud

Saraqeb and Sheikh Maqsoud are two attacks I spent a number of months investigating.  What first caught my interest in the two attacks was the method of attack used.  Reports and images from both attacks suggested a similar method of attack, my initial thoughts on which I detailed in this April 2013 post.  The March 29th Saraqeb attack, which took place two weeks after the Sheikh Maqsoud, is described in the UN report

The source close to the opposition claimed that, on 29 March 2013, a helicopter was seen passing above the western part of Saraqueb flying from north to south and that the helicopter allegedly dropped items at three locations. The first point of impact was reportedly in the northern area of the town, the second in the middle of the courtyard of a family house, and the third was close to an opposition checkpoint on the roads to Idlib and Aleppo.
A trail of white smoke reportedly came down from the helicopter as improvised munitions were allegedly observed being dropped. 

Based on the information gathered by the United Nations Mission from the source close to the opposition, the Saraqueb incident was atypical for an event involving alleged use of chemical weapons. The munitions allegedly used could hold only as little as 200 ml of a toxic chemical. Allegedly tear gas and chemical weapon munitions were used in parallel. The core of the device allegedly used was a cinder block (building material of cement) with round holes. These holes could, allegedly, serve to “secure” small hand grenades from exploding. As the cinder block hit the ground, the handles of the grenades would become activated and discharged. Some of the hand grenade–type munitions allegedly contained tear gas, whereas other grenades were filled with Sarin.

I've spoken to a number of chemical weapon specialists about this method deliver in the past (earlier interviews here, here, and here), and the general viewpoint has been this would be a really odd way of delivering Sarin.  There's video and photographic evidence from Saraqeb, with the BBC report on Saraqeb showing video footage of the munition falling through the sky, as described in the UN report


The shattered remains of one of the cinder blocks used


And photographs and videos of the grenades used


Compared to the Saraqeb report, there was very little information on the Sheikh Maqsoud attack, but what there was appears to link it to the Saraqeb attack.  Aside from reports of a helicopter dropping the munitions, we also had a series of photographs


In these photographs we see the remains of the same type of white grenade, surrounded by the same type of debris that appears to have come from a disintegrating cinder block.  It would seem that this evidence would link the two attacks, and point towards the use of Sarin in the Sheikh Masqoud attack.

The story of the white grenades didn't stop there.  In May, I was sent the following photograph from Jeffry Ruigendijk of a Jabhat al-Nusra fighter (hi-res here)



This begged the question of whether or not Jabhat al-Nusra has the same grenades, and what they actually were.  Journalist Alfred Hackensberger took up the challenge of finding out, and detailed his finding in my blog post The Hunt For Chemical Weapon Attack Linked Gas Grenades In Syria

At beginning, nobody recognized them and we thought we are at a dead end. But later, we found two rebels at front line position in Assafireh who immediately recognized them. They were sure of seeing them on rebels, but didn't remember if the were from Liwa Tawhid or al-Nusra. But anyway, they said this were smoke grenades, not chemical grenades. Later in Aleppo we found two more men who said same thing.

He said, that he saw these grenades (the original one from Saraqeb and Maqsoud) during his military service over one year ago in Daraa (before he defected). An elite force, supposedly from the 4th Division, was training with these grenades. His officer told him that the grenades were delivered by Iran and would contain, beside smoke, a certain nerve relaxant, to calm protesters down. The former soldier also said that these grenades were not used at that time.

So it seems that if these grenades were carrying Sarin in the Saraqeb attack, they don't appear to have been designed to do so.  For me, the Saraqeb and Sheikh Maqsoud attacks have always been a bit of a mystery. The delivery method has seemed, awkward, and almost self-endangering.  Why use a helicopter to deliver just 3 of the munitions, for such a tiny number of causalities, in areas where the attack has no obvious military value?  Could what we've seen in these attacks have been a test? There were certainly no other reports of these munitions being recovered in relation to chemical attacks, so it remains somewhat of a mystery.

----------
More responses to the UN report can be found in part 2 and part 3 of this series.

In this second part of my ongoing series on the final UN report into the use of chemical weapons in Syria, Hamish de Bretton-Gordon, Former Commander UK CBRN Forces and COO SecureBio, looks at what the UN/OPCW did and didn't achieve, and details his thoughts on the use of chemical weapons in Syria.

In part three of my review of the final UN report into the use of chemical weapons in Syria, Dan Kaszeta of Strongpoint Security takes a look at the chemical evidence in the report, and details what could be some key evidence.

Fluoride reactivation / regeneration techniques

Many observers, myself included, were worried about whether too much time had elapsed between exposure of alleged victims and the collection of biomedical samples.  I was also discouraged by the fact that the UN’s earlier report did not go into any great detail on the technical methods used for analysis of the samples.  Much of the technical discussion at the time involved techniques that were used in the aftermath of the 1994 and 1995 Japanese incidents, which have shortcomings. Acetylcholinesterase counting is non-specific and can’t tie the sample to an exact causative agent.  Measurement of direct Sarin, IMPA and MPA levels is rather time limited, due to hydrolysis of Sarin and the body’s gradual elimination of IMPA and MPA.  With regard to the incidents in Syria, the time elapsed between alleged exposure and the collection of biomedical samples meant that, at best, these older techniques would have been at the outside edge of their usefulness, if not useless entirely.

The final UN report provides some additional details about the technical methodology that I find reassuring.  Plasma and whole blood samples were prepared for definitive analysis by using a technique known variously as fluoride regeneration or fluoride reactivation. Fluoride reactivation is a technique has been explored since at least the early 2000s.  This technique obviates some of the deficiencies of older procedures.  Sarin not only reacts with the water in the blood plasma through hydrolysis (forming so-called ‘free metabolites’), but also reacts with various proteins to form ‘protein adducts’.  These protein adducts are not so easily removed from the body, and remain for a longer period of time than the free metabolites.  One clear advantage of this process is that the period, post-exposure, for determination of Sarin exposure is much longer, possibly 5 to 8 weeks according to at least one study. (Polhuijs M. et. al)

The fluoride reactivation process adds fluoride (often by use of a sodium fluoride solution) to the protein adducts to re-create the original Sarin, which can be measured by a number of conventional techniques.  As there are no other reasons why Sarin would be generated by fluoridation of protein adducts in a given blood sample, this technique is a very good indication that the person had been exposed to Sarin.  Also, as the fluoride reactivation specifically creates Sarin molecules, this technique discriminates between the various organophosphates.  In other words, this technique has good specificity –  it rules out exposure to other nerve agents or organophosphate pesticides as the causative agent.  Based on my review of the available literature and discussion with several scientists in this area, I believe that this technique is the best available for this sort of analysis.  I have no reasons to doubt the test results.

A more lengthy technical explanation of some of the earlier work in this area from 2003 and 2004 is contained in an article by E.M. Jakubowski, et. al., which is available online here.

Detection technologies used in laboratory analysis

The combination of gas chromatography and mass spectrometry is widely considered as highly definitive for identification of specific chemical compounds.  Numerous variants of this technique are routinely used around the world for chemical identification. The final report shows the following techniques were used by the OPCW laboratories:

• Gas chromatography–High resolution mass spectrometry 
• Gas chromatography–Tandem mass spectrometry
• Liquid chromatography–Tandem mass spectrometry
• Gas chromatography–Flame photometric detection

This list of techniques is consistent with my expectations.  As long as proper procedures were used, these methods are more than adequate for the chemical identification task.

Analysis of Appendix 5 of the Final Report

The final report, as expected, provides a greater amount  of information about the environmental samples collected at Moadamiyah and Zamalka.   There are numerous small differences between the original interim report’s Appendix 7 and the new Appendix 5.  I will summarize the differences I have discovered:

1. Appendix 5 (i.e. the new report) contains more detailed descriptions of the how and what was sampled.
2. Diisopropyl Methylphosphonate (DIMP) has been recategorized from “degradation and/or byproducts” to “other interesting chemicals.”  There’s no explanation for this re-categorization.  
3. Several of the detections of actual Sarin (GB) are further annotated to indicate either trace or high concentrations.  These terms are not defined.  Only laboratory 2 makes this distinction. 
4. There are some instances of minor discrepancies between the earlier report and the final report. In sample 1, lab 1 shows hexamine, where none was shown in the earlier report.  There can be many reasons why this is the case, including reexamination of samples after the interim report was issued, but that is only speculation.  As a general summary, more chemicals are shown in the final report. 

Specific examples in Appendix 5 that I feel are revelatory:

A guest post by Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi.

Figure 1: Scene from Abu Kamal during a recent period of heavy rain.

When it comes to reporting on Syria, much is written about fighting on the frontlines but comparatively little exists on the nature of factions in towns long since freed of regime control, particularly in the eastern areas of the country. Here I consider the case of the town of Abu Kamal (also Al-Bukamal, which is the more accurate transliteration from Arabic) in Deir az-Zor governorate, along the Euphrates River and bordering Iraq.

It has been out of regime hands since last year, as regime forces- aware of the inability to hold out if spread too thinly- retreated from a number of northern and eastern localities to concentrate on defending provincial capitals. The question now arises of who exactly controls or is present in the town.

In my own research, I have identified a number of factions operating in the town of Abu Kamal and sharing power in the local revolutionary coordination committee: namely, Kata’ib Junud al-Haq, Katiba Bayariq al-Sunna, Kata’ib Allahu Akbar, Liwa Allahu Akbar, Liwa al-Mujahid Omar al-Mukhtar, and Liwa al-Qadisiya al-Islamiya. So what is the nature of each of these groups?

Kata’ib Junud al-Haq

Translating to “Battalions of the Soldiers of Righteousness,” this faction is the local Abu Kamal affiliate of Jabhat al-Nusra. However, it has not exclusively remained in the Abu Kamal area but has rather sent fighters as far afield as the town of ash-Shaddadi in al-Hasakah province to the north and Sakhna in the desert area of Homs governorate, besides the major front of the city of Deir az-Zor itself further up the Euphrates.

Figure 2: Kata’ib Junud al-Haq raid on ash-Shaddadi (the town was taken over by Jabhat al-Nusra) featuring captured regime fighters.

Figure 3: Kata’ib Junud al-Haq in Sakhna, Homs governorate, after capturing a checkpoint.

The group is of particular interest because of its shifts in allegiances on the question of the Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham [ISIS]/Jabhat al-Nusra dispute. When Sheikh Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi announced the existence of ISIS in April, Kata’ib Junud al-Haq switched affiliation to ISIS, changing its emblem to reflect ISIS imagery, releasing a video in May of an ISIS training camp for Abu Kamal, and putting out a statement in the name of “ISIS- Deir az-Zor province” on a failed request to have Abu Kamal students in Deir az-Zor take their exams in their hometown. At the same time, the group’s Facebook page continued to put up graphics and material in support of Jabhat al-Nusra.

Figure 4: Scene from a Kata’ib Junud al-Haq training camp for children: “Cub-Scouts of the Caliphate.” Note the use of the ISIS banner and name. The children also chant a slogan asking God to protect and preserve the muhajireen, indicating, that, like other Jabhat al-Nusra branches, the group has a combination of native Syrians and foreign fighters.

Figure 5: Video released in mid-May while Kata’ib Junud al-Haq was affiliated with ISIS.

Yet after Sheikh Aymenn al-Zawahiri announced that ISIS should be dissolved, Kata’ib Junud al-Haq reverted by late June to Jabhat al-Nusra affiliation, while retaining the new logo it had adopted after Sheikh Baghdadi’s announcement of ISIS. However, by September, the group had reverted to a prior logo indicating explicitly affiliation with Jabhat al-Nusra. However, this reversal of affiliation does not necessarily mean hostility to ISIS, as Kata’ib Junud al-Haq’s spokesman indicated to me in an interview: “We are all brothers.” Further, when I asked him about whether Kata’ib Junud al-Haq supports ISIS’ jihad in Iraq, he indicated in the affirmative.

Figure 6: A logo of Kata’ib Junud al-Haq prior to the announcement of ISIS.

Figure 7: The logo for Kata’ib Junud al-Haq adopted after the announcement of ISIS.

Figure 8: An old Kata’ib Junud al-Haq logo readopted in September.

Besides these shifts in affiliations, Kata’ib Junud al-Haq and Jabhat al-Nusra reinforcements from outside the town also notably clashed with Liwa Allahu Akbar in mid-September. In the wake of these clashes, Jabhat al-Nusra released a statement of apology to the people of Abu Kamal, relevant excerpts of which are featured below.

Figure 9: Copy of jabhat al-Nusra statement released on 16 September for the people of Abu Kamal.

“To our people in Abu Kamal, we offer an apology for what happened last Saturday…and we call to witness God- Almighty and Exalted is He- to the fact that we are not responsible for this fitna…In truth, what happened is the result of the continued attempts by Liwa Allahu Akbar to attack people from the distinguished folk of the land and the members of Jabhat al-Nusra, to the point of launching an attack on the headquarters of Jabhat al-Nusra more than once with arms and attacking the members [of Jabhat al-Nusra], including a strike on the Shari’a committee with 23 mm cannon following on from protests against the Front [Jabhat al-Nusra].

And matters were made worse by what members of Liwa Allahu Akbar undertook last Friday in preventing members of the Front from praying in the mosques, so whenever a member of the Front entered, they prevented him from entering saying it was an order from Saddam [leader of Liwa Allahu Akbar]. An apology and treaties follow on their part from all these incidents of aggression, while we were not responsible for any acts of harassment and aggression during the course of these months against Liwa…but because we are a symbol for Islam, we want to offer an example of forgiveness for the people.

[…]

Where is Jabhat al-Nusra in all these happenings: a group in Deir az-Zor fighting and bringing forth martyrs, and a group in rural Homs attempting to the best of its ability to defend the honor of Muslims, and when the matter came to our attention regarding the preventing of us from praying in the mosques and the manifest aggression, it was thus that we summoned members from the fighting fronts to protect what remained of our members in Abu Kamal after we saw what Liwa Allahu Akbar was planning from acts of aggression in preparation to fight the Islamists and that is because its leadership is in Turkey, their alliances are well-known; and their ambition to rule Syria and establish a secular state is not concealed from anyone, and for the sake of this there has been established what is called the alliance of Ahfad al-Rasul.”

After describing in-depth the alleged sequence of events on the Saturday whereby Liwa Allahu Akbar opened fire on Jabhat al-Nusra and the latter responded in defense of its members and headquarters in Abu Kamal, the statement documents the following post-clash conditions:

“1. Embracing a ceasefire on our part and an end to armed demonstrations on our part in defense of the souls of the innocent civilians in accordance with the demand of the wise and judicious of Abu Kamal.

2. Whoever attacks us, we will respond to him in kind or greater, as this is the path of God- the Almighty has said: ‘For whosoever attacks you, attack him just as he attacked you.’

3. Entrusting a committee composed of the different battalions in Abu Kamal to investigate the disappearance of Khattab al-Rakheetah as per a request from Saddam.

In conclusion, we thank all those who stood by us from the different families and tribes of Abu Kamal and its countryside as well as its distinguished men not out of love for our members but out of love for our Islamic program- may God reward them. So we ask God- Almighty and Exalted is He- to guide the youth of Liwa who are misguided by their leadership…So we ask the families of the youth not to offer their sons and their pure blood for the sake of the glory of this person called Saddam, who will not benefit them in this world in preference to the Hereafter: a man who pushes them into battles and wars so that he can attain power, wealth and fame as they shout: ‘With soul and blood, we defend you oh Saddam!’”

The relevant text of the ceasefire agreement between Liwa Allahu Akbar and Jabhat al-Nusra- signed on 13 September by most of the battalions I listed above- is as follows:

“-Withdrawal of members of Liwa [Allahu Akbar] and Jabhat al-Nusra to their headquarters, with no placing of checkpoints and the leaving of protection and checkpoints to Katiba Amniya [joint security committee with recruits drawn from all factions], Allahu Akbar and the other kata’ib.

- No entry of masked men from any front.

-No raid on any home except by the Shari’a Committee and Katiba Amniya.

-Every week or more the putting in place of a program for a meeting gathering the leadership of the battalions and the brigades with discussion of any incident and accounting for harm on any side.

[…]

- Withdrawal of the muhajireen since there is no fighting in Abu Kamal and no need for masked men and armed demonstrations.”

Figure 10: Text of ceasefire agreement in Abu Kamal.

Like most battalions, Kata’ib Junud al-Haq has its selection of martyrs, primarily pointing to local origins with names such as Amr al-Ishaq al-Dulaimi, Mohammed Abd al-Razzaq al-Farh, Karam al-Karkoush, Ahmad Aboud al-Hussein, Firas al-Jahjah, Ahmad Naji al-Quduri, and Mohammed Rabie al-Mousli.

Figure 11: Scene in Abu Kamal from early September featuring the funeral of Mohammed Rabie al-Mousli, killed in the city of Deir az-Zor. His body was covered by the Jabhat al-Nusra flag.

Figure 12: From a video dedicated to Kata’ib Junud al-Haq martyr Abu Mus’ab Maher al-Tafah, indicating the group’s ideological affinity- as expected from a branch of Jabhat al-Nusra- as the martyr’s photo is featured alongside photos of al-Qa’ida figures like Osama bin Laden and Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi.

Katiba Bayariq al-Sunna

Figure 13: Emblem of Katiba Bayariq al-Sunna

The name of this group translates to “Banners of the Sunna Battalion.” The battalion- led by one Abdullah al-Habib- describes itself as independent, but in an interview, the group’s spokesman affirmed to me that Katiba Bayariq al-Sunna shares the ideology of Kata’ib Junud al-Haq and supports the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate. Indeed, it would seem that there is close general affinity between Kata’ib Junud al-Haq and Katiba Bayariq al-Sunna. However, the membership of the latter battalion is exclusively native Syrian.

It was a signatory to the 13 September ceasefire agreement and like Kata’ib Junud al-Haq has deployed fighters beyond Abu Kamal, most notably in the city of Deir az-Zor, where it closely coordinated with the Fatihun min Ard ash-Sham brigade and Jabhat al-Nusra in operations in al-Rashdiya quarter during the autumn, consequently being praised by the former group in October. In November, the battalion sent a further deployment of fighters to al-Rashdiya.

Katiba Bayariq al-Sunna also distributes weekly da’wah (faith outreach) pamphlets for the local population in Abu Kamal.

Figure 14: Section of a da’wah pamphlet from April distributed by Katiba Bayariq al-Sunna, with sections on interpretation of the Qur’an, “al-Hadith al-Mawḍu’” (i.e. discussion of a hadith weakest in reliability in being attributed to the Prophet or his Companions), “Flags of the Ummah,” “Don’t be Sad,” “From the Life of the Companions” and “It’s not from the Sunna.”

Figure 15: Photo from June of fighters from Katiba Bayariq al-Sunna- “Lions of the Sunna”- in the group’s training grounds.

Figure 16: Photo from Deir az-Zor taken by members of Katiba Bayariq al-Sunna.

Figure 17: Another scene from Deir az-Zor.

Figure 18: From October, vehicle from a Katiba Bayariq al-Sunna convoy on its way to Deir az-Zor. Note the ISIS flag on the vehicle, corroborating the testimony related to me regarding the group’s jihadist ideological affiliations.

Figure 19: Katiba Bayariq al-Sunna preparing to fire missiles at regime forces in Hawiqa, Deir az-Zor, where ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra have also operated.

Figure 20: Scene from military training exercises Katiba Bayariq al-Sunna runs for local children.

Kata’ib Allahu Akbar

Figure 21: Logo of the Kata’ib Allahu Akbar

The “Allahu Akbar Battalions”: the group is distinguished by its affiliation with the eastern branch of the “Jabhat al-Asliya wa al-Tanmiya” (Authenticity and Development Front), which is a nationwide alliance of rebel groups that use FSA flags and symbols but do not actually identify themselves as part of ‘the FSA’: see, for example, this message from late April directed from Kata’ib Allahu Akbar to the “Free Army,” urging for unity in the latter’s ranks.

Apparently taking its name from calling Abu Kamal “the Allahu Akbar town,” it is led by one Khaz’al al-Sirhan (Abu al-Waleed, who refers to the struggle against “the immoral Nusayri regime”) and it played a role in the capture of Hamdan military airport near Abu Kamal in November of last year, claiming some military defectors in the process. The group also seems to have a subsidiary military unit-Liwa al-Fatah al-Mubin- and has participated more recently in fighting for Deir az-Zor military airport.

Figure 22: Logo of Liwa al-Fatah al-Mubin

Figure 23: Wall mural set up by Kata’ib Allahu Akbar/Liwa al-Fatah al-Mubin dedicated to martyrs of Abu Kamal. Note the FSA-banner flags.

Figure 24: Fighters from Liwa al-Fatah al-Mubin in Abu Kamal area.

In May, Kata’ib Allahu Akbar put out a statement announcing the formation of an “Army of the town of Allahu Akbar in Abu Kamal,” consisting of Liwa Allahu Akbar, Liwa al-Mujahid Omar al-Mukhtar, Liwa al-Qadisiya, Kata’ib Allahu Akbar, and Katiba Bayariq al-Sunna. However, while the statement appears to bear the relevant leaders’ signatures, there is no evidence to suggest that this formation ever came to exist as something beyond a declaration on paper, and testimony I gathered elsewhere- which I will detail below as regards insistence on independence- also tells against this supposed army existing on the ground.

Figure 25: Statement in May announcing “Army of the town of Allahu Akbar in Abu Kamal.”

As for the ideology of the Kata’ib Allahu Akbar in line with the wider Authenticity and Development Front, it was outlined to me in an interview as follows by the head of the military office of the Kata’ib Allahu Akbar:

“Of course our ‘aqida like the rest of the Syrian people is Sunni Islam and we want the rule of God’s law and the creation of laws derived from the Qur’an and Sunna of His Prophet- may God’s peace and blessings be upon Him- with the protection of the rest of the rights for the other sects as specified for them by the Shari’a.

Our program is moderate and for justice and we do not declare takfir on anyone from the Ahl al-Qibla [i.e. those who adhere to the tenets of Islam]…and our school of thought consists of the great ‘ulama of the Ahl al-Salf like Ibn Taymiyya and Ibn Baz.”

The ideological vision of Kata’ib Allahu Akbar and the wider Authenticity and Development Front is therefore very much in accord with the Sunni Islamism that has characterized other major rebel groups like Liwa al-Tawhid (at least prior to the latter’s joining the Islamic Front). The most notable overlaps with the recent Salafi-leaning Islamic Front are the claim to protect minority rights within the framework of Shari’a and the claim to follow the likes of Ibn Taymiyya, which partly explains the anti-Alawite sentiment that is very much mainstream in the insurgency. In any event, the head of the military office also made clear to me that Kata’ib Allahu Akbar has good working relations with all factions in Abu Kamal and is currently participating on the same military fronts where they are fighting.

Liwa Allahu Akbar

Figure 26: Emblem of the Liwa Allahu Akbar

The “Allahu Akbar Brigade” is an affiliate of the nationwide Ahfad al-Rasul (“Descendants of the Prophet”) network aligned with Salim Idriss’ Supreme Military Command (SMC). Like Kata’ib Allahu Akbar, Liwa Allahu Akbar played a role in many incidents of fighting against regime forces last year, including the capture of Hamdan military airport, but unlike Kata’ib Allahu Akbar, the group not only uses FSA imagery but also calls itself part of ‘the FSA.’ The leader of the local Abu Kamal branch was until recently one Saddam al-Jamal, who was noted above in reference to the conflict with Jabhat al-Nusra in September.

However, a video recently emerged showing Saddam appearing in front of an ISIS flag, claiming his defection from Liwa Allahu Akbar to ISIS. Saddam goes on to document an alleged conspiracy involving Qatari, Turkish, Jordanian, Saudi and Western intelligence agencies whereby the Ahfad al-Rasul movement- originally of non-ideological orientation and just concerned with bringing the downfall of the regime- was co-opted as part of the wider FSA to fight ISIS.

It is of course true that generally speaking, the Ahfad al-Rasul movement lacks a clear manifesto and political program, and as noted above in the conflict with Jabhat al-Nusra, this point has made it the target of criticism for supposedly being only concerned with profiteering and warlordism.

As for ISIS’ accusation of collaboration with Western intelligence, this is a charge ISIS has leveled at Ahfad al-Rasul before during the conflict with the local Raqqa branch of Ahfad al-Rasul that saw the movement expelled from the city in August. Like the video of Saddam al-Jamal, ISIS circles put out a video in August of an Ahfad al-Rasul detainee in Raqqa purporting to document how the movement received aid from France to take on ISIS, whence the derisive name ‘Ahfad Faransa’ (“Descendants of France”) in ISIS circles for Ahfad al-Rasul.

When I asked Kata’ib Junud al-Haq’s spokesman about the video of Saddam al-Jamal, he confirmed to me that it is indeed authentic but pointed out to me he did not defect willingly. Rather, he was kidnapped, though the abduction did not take place in the town of Abu Kamal itself, but in an “unknown location.” More recently, rumors have claimed that ISIS has appointed Saddam al-Jamal as its own local commander for the Abu Kamal area, but I find no evidence from my local contacts to corroborate that.

It should also be noted that even after the ceasefire agreement between Jabhat al-Nusra and Liwa Allahu Akbar, not everything was harmonious, as Saddam al-Jamal escaped an assassination attempt in late September.

Figure 27: Aftermath of failed assassination attempt on Saddam al-Jamal in Abu Kamal.

Liwa al-Mujahid Omar al-Mukhtar

Figure 28: Emblem of Liwa al-Mujahid Omar al-Mukhtar

The “Mujahid Omar al-Mukhtar Brigade”: its name derives from the Libyan anti-colonial revolutionary Omar al-Mukhtar. In an interview, the group’s spokesman Abu Louay emphasized to me that the battalion is “independent” and while it has no links with “Islamic extremists,” it also rejects the Syrian opposition-in-exile coalition (SNC), despite sharing photos and postings of developments regarding the SNC on Facebook. In fact, Abu Louay indicated to me that Liwa al-Mujahid Omar al-Mukhtar has no ideology or political program, but is simply concerned with bringing about the downfall of the Assad regime.

Like most of the other groups documented above, it was a signatory to the September ceasefire and has played a role in more recent fighting outside of Abu Kamal, most notably in the city of Deir az-Zor. For these recent efforts, Liwa al-Mujahid Omar al-Mukhtar was commended by Katiba Bayariq al-Sunna. Interestingly, it has also claimed some martyrs from a deployment sent to aid the wider rebel front in the Qalamoun area of Damascus province.

Figure 29: Liwa al-Mujahid Omar al-Mukhtar convoy on the desert highways of Deir az-Zor province. Photo from late October.

Figure 30: Liwa al-Mujahid Omar al-Mukhtar fighters in Deir az-Zor with Liwa al-Qadisiya al-Islamiya, another Abu Kamal-based battalion.

Figure 31: An FSA flag alongside a Liwa al-Mujahid Omar al-Mukhtar banner, yet the group is independent.

Figure 32: Mohammed Mena’ Aboud al-Mena’, killed in Qalamoun.

Figure 33: Hamza Sulayman al-Zakarti, another fighter for Liwa al-Mujahid Omar al-Mukhtar killed in the Qalamoun area.

Liwa al-Qadisiya al-Islamiya

Figure 34: Emblem of Liwa al-Qadisiya al-Islamiya

As mentioned above, Liwa al-Qadisiya al-Islamiya has participated in fighting outside Abu Kamal in Deir az-Zor province. Having an Islamic name but lacking a coherent political program, it appears to be one of the most recent formations in the Abu Kamal area and according to Kata’ib Junud al-Haq’s spokesman, it does not have a very significant presence inside the town. That said, the battalion, which is independent, has also coordinated with Salafist groups Ahrar ash-Sham and Liwa al-Haq as well as local Abu Kamal ally Liwa al-Mujahid Omar al-Mukhtar in targeting with Grad missiles Al-Tefur military airbase in the desert of Homs governorate during the autumn of this year.

Figure 35: Liwa al-Qadisiya al-Islamiya and Liwa al-Mujahid Omar al-Mukhtar fighters on their way to Homs governorate.

Figure 36: Liwa al-Qadisiya al-Islamiya vehicle on its way to the city of Deir az-Zor. Photo taken on 28 October.

Other Groups

While the above factions are the ones with meaningful power in the town of Abu Kamal itself (as corroborated in my interview with Kata’ib Junud al-Haq’s spokesman), the overall area with its surrounding countryside is home to more very small and generally insignificant factions. Some groups appear to be defunct: a case-in-point being the Katiba Junud al-Haq (“Battalion of the Soldiers of Righteousness”), which went by the FSA-label and not only conducted joint operations in 2012 with Jabhat al-Nusra in the Abu Kamal area but also released joint statements, such as a claim in October of that year to have downed a regime fighter jet in a coordinated operation between Jabhat al-Nusra, a member of Katiba Junud al-Haq, and Katiba Dhi al-Nurain. The group has since October 2012 otherwise been inactive, and likely evolved into Kata’ib Junud al-Haq that became a formal Jabhat al-Nusra affiliate. Other groups like Katiba Saraya al-Tawhid- similarly using FSA imagery- were announced to be part of some mergers last year, only never to be heard of again, whether in separate form or as part of the declared FSA mergers in the Abu Kamal area.

Figure 37: Emblem of Katiba Junud al-Haq, identified as part of the “Free Army.”

Figure 38: Katiba Suqur al-Islam (“Falcons of Islam Battalion”), another apparently defunct FSA-banner group from the Abu Kamal area.

From the active factions of the town of Abu Kamal, can we identify a leading faction in particular? In my view, the answer to this question is yes. The key is to turn to examine the nature of the Shari’a committee of Abu Kamal.

The Shari’a Committee of Abu Kamal

Figure 39: Emblem of the Shari’a Committee of Abu Kamal.

The authority of the Shari’a committee of Abu Kamal is respected by all the factions operating in the town of Abu Kamal, but as indicated to me in an interview with the committee’s spokesman, it is led solely by Jabhat al-Nusra. Even without conducting an interview, it should be apparent that Jabhat al-Nusra leads the committee because the Shari’a institute is named after Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, who was a mentor of Osama bin Laden and an influential ideologue behind the foundation of al-Qa’ida (“martyred in Afghanistan,” as the spokesman for Kata’ib Junud al-Haq put it to me). The Shari’a committee regularly releases statements and has worked to crack down on smuggling of sheep, for example, from Syria to Iraq.

Figure 40: Shari’a Committee statement released this month and addressed to “all the fighting battalions and factions in the Abu Kamal area,” announcing a new session of intensive Shari’a learning at the Sheikh Abdullah Azzam Shari’a Institute.

Figure 41: The Sheikh Abdullah Azzam Institute for Shari’a Learning.

Figure 42: A classroom in the Shari’a Institute.

Conclusion

The town of Abu Kamal defies simple characterizations. Indeed, pace Elizabeth O’Bagy’s misleading map in her now infamous Wall Street Journal op-ed, it would be wrong to think of Abu Kamal as a mere stronghold for “extremist groups.” The reality is that there are factions of a range of orientations in Abu Kamal, from non-ideological (Liwa al-Mujahid Omar al-Mukhtar and Liwa Allahu Akbar) to standard Islamist (Kata’ib Allahu Akbar) and pan-Islamist/jihadist (Kata’ib Junud al-Haq/Jabhat al-Nusra and Katiba Bayariq al-Sunna). This kind of arrangement can similarly be found in a number of towns with an ISIS presence, such as Tel Abyaḍ in Raqqa governorate, and Idlib towns like Saraqeb, Salqin and Ma’arat an-Na’aman.

As the September ceasefire agreement shows, Jabhat al-Nusra cannot simply do as it pleases in Abu Kamal, but it is not unreasonable to conclude that it is the leading faction in the town, especially in light of its monopoly on the Shari’a committee.

From the Iraqi perspective, there is the additional problem that the ISIS and Jabhat al-Nusra split does not really matter in the borderlands- something particularly apparent in the testimony relayed to me and corroborated by the fact that Zawahiri insists on cooperation between mujahideen in Syria and Iraq anyway. The Abu Kamal area is certainly an environment where cross-border exchange of manpower and resources between mujahideen can easily take place.

More generally, the number of factions in the area- considering Abu Kamal’s relatively small size- points to rampant localism across the rebel-held areas of Syria. Go a little further up the Euphrates in Deir az-Zor province and you will find a different set of factions in a town like Mayadeen. It is hard to see any kind of unifying rebel authority- let alone the unrepresentative Syrian opposition-in-exile- being able to assert itself over the expanse of rebel-held lands in Deir az-Zor province any time soon.

Aymenn Jawad Al-Tamimi is a Shillman-Ginsburg Fellow at the Middle East Forum and a student at Brasenose College, Oxford University. His website is http://www.aymennjawad.org 

Earlier this week, Die Welt published a piece by Alfred Hackensberger, "Islamists are worse than Assad", which included an interview with a Libyan, identified as Alah al-Fakhri, detailing his experiences as a foreign fighter in Syria.  The article translates rather well from German to English, and details the fighters time with Ansar al-Allah, which he claims was part of Jabhat al-Nusra, and how he reached Syria with the help of Ansar al-Sharia in Libya.  Alfred Hackensberger has sent me parts of the interview with the fighter which didn't make it to the Die Welt article, which provides additional information on the fighters experience.  The text has been translated from Arabic to German, then German to English.

Question: You went to Syria to fight. Why does a Libyan go to another country to fight?
Answer: This is the solidarity of a Muslim who aids his beleaguered brethren. I wanted to help the Syrian people to obtain their freedom. I wanted to fight alongside the Free Syrian Army, but that did not work out. I ended up with Jihadists.
Q: How did that happen ?
A : I tried to make contacts and a friend had sent me to Ansar al-Sharia. However, I did not who I was fighting with until I arrived in Syria. And it was not the FSA.
Q: With whom then?
A: With a group called Ansar al-Allah, who fought under Jabhat al-Nusra
Q: Were there more foreigners in the group?
A: Yes, most of them were foreigners. They came from Bulgaria, Afghanistan, Egypt, Somalia.
Q: What was standing Ansar al-Allah among the rebels ?
A: They had a bad image. "How can you fight with these people," I had often heard. "They are dangerous and kill people by dozen" .
Q: Have you even seen atrocities?
A: No, I have only heard of it.
Q: How did you come to Syria?
A: We entered the country via Turkey. Some via Istanbul, the others via Ankara. The coordination was in Antakya, also for all other foreign fighters. There, everything was organized, including our trip by bus across the border. They had supplied a bus with women and children, so we came disguised as a family across the border,
Q: Where were you been fighting?
A: In the east of Aleppo in the countryside and also at the airport. Exactly, I can not say that. As I drove back home, I was told : Share no information or names, or we kill you! You have to take these people seriously.
Q: Why did you return to Libya after only a month?
A: It was not what I wanted. They fight for a caliphate in all Arab states. They just want the power to be able to enforce their interests. They do not fight for the Syrian people. I wanted the Syrians only help, want a united state, democracy and Islam. So I'm a non-believer for them. All who disagree are infidels.
Q: Was the group you were with very strict?
A: Music, radio, television and smoking, which was very hard for me as a smoker, was forbidden . Discussions did not exist. If you had just a bit of a different opinion, you could be seen as a Kuffer, an unbeliever, suspicious. I do not want to live in such a repressive atmosphere, let alone put my life in the war on game. I tell you, Bashar al-Assad is not as bad as these people! They are far more dangerous!
Q: Why did not you go to the other Libyan Liwa fighting in Idlib?
A: I did not touch it. As far as I know, they take the route through Egypt to Syria.
Q: What have normal Syrians, ordinary people, say to you as Libyan fighters?
A: In Aleppo I barely came into contact with ordinary civilians. But when leaving I met some. They were very aggressive towards me. “What, do you have to recreate Libya here in Syria? Go back home!” Honestly, I had not imagined!
Q: Does Ansar al-Sharia let go so easily ?
A: That was relatively easy. I said I want to fight longer, but for that I first had to go home to fix this with my family. I was there for all to see me once. They did not know that I would not come back. All others with whom I set off remained.

With the year coming to an end, and websites across the world producing lists of all things 2013, I thought I'd throw my hat in the arena with a list of ten videos that, for me, defined the last 12 months of the Syria conflict, and the way in which social media and open source media has been used to understand the conflict.  This list is in no particular order, nor does it represent the entirety of the hundreds of thousands of videos produced from Syria in the last twelve months, but I hope they represent both the broad spectrum of videos coming from Syria, as well as some of the more newsworthy videos.

10 - Croatian Weapons On Syrian State TV

At the start of 2013, I started to see new weapons appearing in the south of Syria in videos published by groups belonging to the Free Syrian Army.  When I first saw the weapons appear, I thought that perhaps they were just another example of weapons appearing from the local black-market, but then I saw a report on Syrian State TV that indicated this was something much bigger.  The original video is no longer online, but the footage from the report can be seen in this video from ANNA News at 0:47


As per the English subtitles on the video, Syrian State TV identified at least some of the weapons of being Israeli in origin, but this an example of something I've seen time and time again in Syria, where a much more interesting story is missed because of the attempts to use images as propaganda (another recent example of that is here).

For me, this video was the point where I realised the weapons I had been seeing weren't just a handful of weapons purchased on the black-market, but something much bigger.  I then began to review all the videos posted on YouTube channels, looking for more examples of these weapons, so I could understand what was going on with these weapons.  What I did was actually pretty simple, I watched videos, then documented them on a pretty simple spreadsheet, posting my findings in a series of blog posts.  James Miller on EA Worldview and Michael Weiss on Now Lebanon were the first to pick up on my work, and eventually I compiled the information I had collected into a post for the New York Times' At War blog, which led to the New York Times using the information I had provided to take the investigation further, exposing a smuggling route that involved Croatia, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan, all with the apparent knowledge of the CIA (more here).

This was a great example of how studying and analysing information posted to social media can help inform traditional methods of investigative journalism. The areas these weapons appeared in were pretty much isolated from the rest of the conflict, at the time the weapons started appearing there were no Western journalists in the area, and it's unclear if they would have been aware of the significance of the weapons, nor the scale of their appearance in the region.  Thanks to nothing more than YouTube videos and a spreadsheet, I was able to gather information that helped expose a secret smuggling operation, and that clearly demonstrates how valuable this open source information can be.

9 - ISIS Executes Three Men In Raqqa

Sometimes it's hard to imagine that less than 9 months ago the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham was barely known, but for me, one video was the clear point where they started to make their mark on the conflict in Syria


The video, posted in May from the city of Raqqa, shows three men being executed in a town square in front of a large crowd.  What was unusual about this video is the group carrying out the executions.  At the time, Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, the leader of the Islamic State of Iraq, had recently announced Jabhat al-Nusra would merge with the Islamic State of Iraq to form the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham.  This video showed the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham carrying out the execution, and seemed to be also announcing the arrival of ISIS to the conflict in Syria.

Since the video was published, ISIS has grown to dominate much of the discourse about the Syrian opposition, and they've worked to establish control of  the opposition held areas in the north (detailed here).  To me, this video represents the first time they really made their presence felt in Syria, and it certainly wasn't the only public execution they've carried out in the months since.

8 - How To Make A Hell Cannon

The Syrian conflict has continued to produce a variety of DIY weapons from both sides of the conflict, but this year, one stood out among all others.  The dramatically named "Hell Cannon" first appeared back in late April, and it's arrival was marked with the following video, showing the manufacturing process for the Hell Cannon, and it's ammunition


The group producing the Hell Cannon seemed quite proud of their invention, even producing a statistics sheet for it (more details here)


The Hell Cannon has continued to be a popular choice with opposition forces, with dozens of videos showing it in action posted online, and it even became part of the push back against claims that the government was responsible for the August 21st attacks.  While not the mostly widely used DIY weapon by the opposition, in 2013, it has certainly been the most noticeable.

7 - The Daisy Chain IED Attack

Since early on in the conflict, IEDs have been a mainstay of the Syrian opposition arsenal, but one video stood out from the many IED videos posted online by various opposition groups in Syria


In this very unusual example, 50 IEDs were reportedly linked together, to create a daisy chain of explosions, destroying a convoy.  While many reported cases of IED use in Syria are the various VBIED attacks often used as part of opposition military operations, it shouldn't be forgotten that smaller IEDs have also played a widespread and key role in the conflict.

Richard M. Lloyd, Warhead Technology Consultant at Tesla Laboratory Inc. takes a look at the DIY barrel bombs used in Syria.

Introduction
The Syrian government over the last year has supplemented their traditional conventional air campaign with cheap weapons that have been referred to as Barrel Bombs (BB). These Do It Yourself (DIY) weapons are derived from low cost cylinders that are filled with explosive, fuel and irregular shaped steel fragments. These DIY bombs are manually deployed by soldiers from Russian HIP helicopters. The idea is these helicopters can roam around Syrian neighbourhoods and drop these weapons with more accuracy then firing aircraft rockets.  The purpose of this paper is provide some fundamental frame work of how these bombs work, while exploring the myths and false information that has been associated with these weapons.

Figure 1 Syrian Helicopter Shot Down With Rebel Fired MANPADS

Figure 2 Comparison Of HIP Mi-8 Barrel Bomb And HIND Conventional Bomb

Barrel bombs designs that are observed though social media demonstrate that the Syrian government designed these barrel bombs with a fuse wick that requires a heat source (matches, cigarettes, cigars) to ignite.  The Syrian government must of made a simple calculation that if the helicopter is at a known altitude (H) and the fuse wick burns at a known rate (\(\begin{equation} \dot{b} \end{equation}\)) then the time that it takes for the bomb to detonate is \(\begin{equation} t=H/\dot{b} \end{equation}\). However, this simple equation that computes the time before detonation is false.  Whoever designed these barrel bombs does not understand that their is a 10% burn rate error in the fuse wick.  They also don't understand that if the helicopter is not at the designed altitude it will effect the time of fall.  In conjunction with these errors, they did not take into account the barrel size, mass, barrel bomb L/D ratio, tumble rate, drag effects, wind speed as well as the time it takes the soldier to deploy the bombs once its been lit inside the helicopter. All of these effects must be accounted for if a fuse wick is going to be used.  Lets perform and example calculation that only considers the 10% error source of the fuse wick burn rate and assume all the other errors are zero or negligible. The Syrian government would first be required to compute the terminal velocity of the barrel bomb by using the equation \(\begin{equation} V=\sqrt{2W/\rho AC_{d}} \end{equation}\).  The terminal velocity accounts for the weight of the barrel bomb as well as the air density, average cross sectional area and drag of the barrel falling to the ground.  A 500lb barrel bomb has a terminal velocity near 250f/s. Based on this calculation the time it takes the barrel to impact the ground is just 7000ft/250ft/s=28 seconds.  So, the selected fuse wick that has a known burn rate is cut to a length which would burn for 28 seconds and detonate just when it impacts the ground. However, since their is a 10% burn rate error, there exists a probability that it could detonate early.  If the burn rate is 10% to fast then the entire fuse wick would have completed its burn at 25.2 seconds.  This means the warhead would detonate 700ft before hitting the ground.  An example of these early bursts have been seen through many videos as shown in figure 3.

Figure 3 Barrel Bombs Detonate Early From Negative Errors

These early bursts  have been widely seen in Syria, which are caused from an accumulation of all the errors that potentially can exist.  It is unknown how accurate the helicopter pilot attempts to keep the helicopter at the designed altitude are.  It is also unclear if the Syrian barrel bomb builders understand drag effects and fuse wick errors and probability timing . Another example of another error is a Syrian Solider lighting and pushing barrel bombs out of the helicopter. This time must be accounted for and there is obviously no control of how the bomb is thrown out where time must be accounted for.  A photo of a Syrian soldier pushing a barrel bomb out of a helicopter is shown in figure 4.

Figure 4 Description of Barrel Bombs On Syrian Helicopter Prior to Deployment

These early barrel bomb weights are around 100-300lbs and are initiated from using fuse wicks. The soldier lights the fuse wick using a cigar because the wind effects would blow out a match or lighter.  A close up of the fuse wicks is also shown where they should all have the same length.  After the fuse wick is lit, the soldier quickly pushes the bomb from the helicopter. It is unclear how the Syrian designers of these bombs expected to time the fall exactly because their is clear evidence that many of these barrel bombs detonated early which is referred to a negative time delay.

The above analysis has only considered what could happen if the total time is less then the required time to detonate the barrel bombs given a ground impact.  However, what would happen if the barrel bomb detonated late. Based on our example problem, the fuse wick would burn for a longer time then 28 seconds.  If this occurs, then the barrel bomb would actually hit the ground or a building while the fuse wick is still burning.  If this occurred, then based on video and photo evidence the barrel bomb would shatter upon ground impact or detonate if the fuse wick and bomb were not destroyed. There is clear evidence that barrel bombs can detonate given a positive delay time as shown in figure 5. This figure shows two potential out comes when the time delay is positive where the barrel bomb will either detonate or dud.

Figure 5 Comparison Of BB Detonating or Duding Based On Positive Time Delay

The next step is to try to understand why there is and explosion in one case and not in another. One explanation, given all is equal is the shock wave though out the barrel bomb front endplate which holds the fuse wick. The stress of a steel case impacting concrete, grass or sand has been investigated.  By using the shock Hugoniot equation \(\begin{equation}
P=\rho c\mu+\rho s\mu
\end{equation}\) , the interface pressure between the ground surface and steel barrel bomb is calculated.  The density of the material is \(\begin{equation}
\rho
\end{equation}\)while the bulk sound speed of the material is \(\begin{equation}
c
\end{equation}\) where \(\begin{equation}
\mu
\end{equation}\)is the particle velocity and s is the slope between shock velocity and material stress. These calculations show that the impact stress of a barrel bomb impacting concrete or rock is 3.5-5 times greater then if the barrel bomb impacted sand or dry soil.  This increase in stress will cause the endplate that holds the fuse wick in place to fracture from the barrel bomb which disables the bomb to work.

Another important parameter that must be considered that would determine if positive time delayed barrel bombs can detonate is the impact point on the bomb. If a barrel bomb impacts directly on the fuse endplate, then their is increased probability that the bomb could fail.  Through video analysis and ground inspection, these barrel bombs do not contain any fins to help control the fall of the bomb in providing stabilization.  These bombs randomly tumble and the probability that these bombs could impact on the fuse/endplate is just 1/6 or 16.6%. If we assume a uniform random distribution of barrel bombs that contain negative and positive time delays, then just based on this fact the probability of a positive bomb impact is 50%.  As of now, their is a 50% chance the bomb will not work and a 50% chance that the bomb will work.  Now lets account for the ground and the impact position of the barrel to the ground.  If the barrel bomb impacts concrete then the bomb will break apart and not work as intended. However, if the bomb impacts softer ground, there is probability as observed that these bombs will not break apart and function correctly. Our analysis assumes a 50% probability that the bomb will impact concrete/rock and a 50% probability that the bomb will impact sand or grass with light rubble.  This means the probability that the bomb will function is just the probability that the time delay is positive or negative and the probability that the ground is hard or soft.  This calculation is \(\begin{equation}
P=(1-0.5)(1-0.5)=0.25
\end{equation}\)which means there is a 25% chance these fuse wick barrel bombs will work. So, it requires the Syrian Government to deploy 4 barrel bombs to get one bomb to detonate the way it's intended.  A description of two different barrel bombs is shown in figure 6.  The barrel bomb on the left is one that impacted on a soft surface and the stress was not high enough to fracture off the fuse wick endplate, while the barrel bomb on the right shows it hit concrete and fractured off the fuse wick endplate.

Figure 6 Comparison Between Barrel Bombs Impacts Soft And Hard Surfaces

Barrel Bomb Designs
The remains of these duded barrel bombs have been investigated to understand how the Syrian government has assembled them, and to determine how lethal these bombs can be.

It is evident from visual observations that there has been little to no quality control on these designs because of the many shapes and sizes that have been observed.  There appears to be clear design trends that clearly show that Syrian personnel have no weapon design and effects training.  Most Syrian barrel bombs contain many large steel components, such as cut rebar or large machine metal pieces such as large industrial bearings. These large metal chunks are inserted inside and mixed with the TNT explosive. The problem with this approach is when the explosive detonates, it's using a lot of its energy to accelerate these large chucks of metal which reduces its blast effects as clearly seen in figure 7. These added steel materials reduce the blast effects by making the explosive use its energy to accelerate it.

Figure 7 Large Metallic Metal Components Added In Barrel Bomb Explosive Mixture

However, if these large metallic pieces were to impact a human then they would cause catastrophic incapacitation. However, there are mathematical equations that predict the optimum fragment size that is required to kill a person by taking into account probability theory and applying weapon design equations. The probability of incapacitating a person is computed with this equation\(\begin{equation} P=1-e^-a({mv^{3/2-b)^{n}}} \end{equation}\)

Based on this equation, the optimum fragment mass can be computed to increase barrel bomb performance.  The actual barrel bomb case would actually break apart into thousands of small fragments from natural fragmentation of the explosive shock wave interaction with the smooth case.

The fragment mass is m and the impact velocity is v where test derived constants are a, b and n. The velocity of the added metallic fragment is computed by using the Gurney equation which is\(\begin{equation} V=\sqrt{2E}\sqrt{C/M/(1+D/2L)(1+C/2M)} \end{equation}\)
The \(\begin{equation} \sqrt{2E} \end{equation}\)is the explosive Gurney constant which is around 2.4km/s for TNT. The explosive mass is C while the metallic mass plus the barrel bomb case is M. The parameters D and L are barrel bomb diameter and length respectively. The barrel bomb average case fragment can be computed by \(\begin{equation} \mu^{1/2}= Bt^{5/6}d_{i}^{1/3}(1+t/d_i) \end{equation}\) where B is a constant, t is the barrel bomb thickness and \(\begin{equation} d_i \end{equation}\) is the explosive diameter. The estimated number of fragments from the barrel only is \(\begin{equation} N(m)=M/2\mu \end{equation}\)where the number of fragments in a particular weight class is calculated by \(\begin{equation} N(m)=M/2\mu e^{-(m/\mu)^{1/2}} \end{equation}\)

These equations have been exercised pertaining to the Syrian Barrel bombs.  The analysis clearly shows that these weapon are under designed and their lethality in urban areas can significantly increase by changing their approach and understanding weapon effects.  Even though these embedded large chunks of metal are highly lethality against humans, the probability of being hit by one is extremely low. Given a 40ft stand off distance of a human from a barrel bomb explosion, their would be a 96% probability of death given a hit from one of these fragments,  However, the probability if being hit from these chunks of metal is only 3% which gives a total probability if incapacitation of 2.8%. An example calculation is shown in figure 8.

Figure 8 Barrel Bomb Probability of Incapacitation and Probability Equations

The blast effects have been investigated as well where the pressure-impulse to incapacitate a human has been calculated.  The blast damage is directly related to the amount of explosive as well as the metal casing surrounding it. The lethal blast radius has been calculated, but it not reported in this version of the report.

Changing Barrel Bomb Technology
There are several significant changes that have been observed in Syrian barrel bomb technology.  It is evident from these changes that the military determined they were not getting explosive detonations on the ground and their bombs were not working.  The Syrian government has switched from using fuse wick fuses to impact fuses. As stated earlier, these fuse wicks have minimal chance of working because of their time delay errors.  However, the addition of impact fuses accounts for all the errors that are associated with fuse wicks. These new impacts fuses are clearly DIY and in conjunction with these new fuse concepts, the sizes of the barrel bombs has significantly increased.  Today's Syrian barrel bomb weights can exceed over 2000lbs of TNT making them highly lethal given a high order explosive detonation in urban areas. A description of a recovered barrel bomb with these new design features is shown in figure 9.

Figure 9 Newer Barrel Bombs Designed With DIY Impact Fuses

These impact fuses were created using detonation cord to ignite the bulk TNT explosive charge. It is unclear what the exact reliability of these fuses are and how well they actually work. However, it is expected that the Syrian builders have performed some testing of this device to have enough confidence that it will work given that the barrel impacts the ground on the fuse. In order for these new bombs to work they must impact on the fuse which means they must impact on the front of the barrel.  The only way to accomplish this is to add fins to stabilize the bomb so it won't tumble as it falls to the ground.

This recovered barrel bomb did not operate and detonate correctly because the fins appear to be too small.  The explosive weight of this bomb is near 2000lbs while small fins have been attached to the middle of the bomb. Figure 10 is a picture of the small fins that were welded to the center of the bomb.  A picture of a typical Russian bomb is shown which clearly shows these bombs are designed with fins in the back of the bomb and not in the middle.  It has been concluded with high confidence that this massive bomb still tumbles and the probability of falling on the impact fuse is random.  It appears the fins are designed too small and the barrel bomb is randomly tumbling to the ground.  If we assume the probability of the fuse working correctly is 75% and the cylindrical barrel bomb has 6 sides, then given random tumbling, the probability of success is 1/6 or 16.6% given 100% reliability of the fuse. However, if the DIY fuse has a reliability near 75%, then the probability of success is 12%.

Figure 10 Syrian Barrel Bomb With Small Fins Attached To The Middle

It appears the Syrian builders have discovered this problem with their fins and their inability to generate a stable and aligned bomb.  There is clear evidence that the Syrians have moved these fins from the middle of the bomb to the aft end, which is the design norm of all the gravity bombs in the world. Figure 11 shows a large barrel bomb just after it has been deployed.

Figure 11 Large Barrel Bomb Deployment  Showing Initial tumbling Of Weapon

These new design features have increased the probability that the barrel bomb will fall aligned with stable flight and impact the fuse. We have already estimated that the fuse has a 75% chance of working given an impact. Based on these fins relative to known world bombs, it appears that the stability of the bomb will increase but it is still unclear that the fins are large enough and far enough to the back of the bomb to provide good stability.  A conservative estimate of the fin performance based on Russian/US fins relative to the Syrian barrel bombs is 50%. This estimate is based on analyzing Russian bombs of similar weight, and measuring their fin distance and diameter relative to the recovered barrel bombs. Given these 2 performance probabilities, the probability that these new Syrian barrel bombs will work correctly is 37.5%.

Barrel Bomb Design Variations
There has been several recovered barrel bombs that are designed differently compared to most traditional barrel bombs. Some of these barrel bombs contain smaller warheads that are embedded within the explosive to ignite the much larger barrel bomb explosive.  This design technique uses the small warhead as a booster, which is really not required.  An example of this is shown in figure 12.

Figure 12 Syrian Barrel Bomb Using Small Warhead As Booster

The explosive has appeared to be soaked in oil which would give the same features as ANFO. ANFO is an explosive mixture which contains some small percentage of oil.  This oil actually reduces the explosive detonation velocity which reduces the blast and fragment acceleration power of the explosive.  This bomb has an impact fuse, but the most disturbing observation is it has no fins. Without fins, this bombs reliability is very low and the odds of working are small.  In fact, all objects that fly through the air eventually turn and fly with the side with its greatest presented area.  If this rule of thumb is applied, this bomb will never rotate and align its front surface to the ground.  The highest probability of the side with the fuse impacting is just 1/6 or 16.6% which assumes their is equal chance of any side impact. Now, if the reliability of the fuse is 75%, then the probability that the barrel bomb will function is 12.4%.                

The Syrian government over the last year has significantly increased their barrel bomb sizes from hundreds of pounds of explosive to 2000 pounds of explosive. However, there is strong evidence that these weights are larger then this.  Their exists a video that shows Syrian military throwing barrel bombs from  helicopter with a large fuel auxiliary tank. This video shows to the right a large yellow tank which is the helicopter's internal fuel auxiliary tank. This tank can contain over 960 litres of fuel or if it was converted to a high explosive barrel bomb it would contain around 3000-3500lbs of explosive as shown in figure 13.

Figure 13 Syrian Military Using Helicopter Fuel Auxiliary Fuel Tank As Barrel Bomb

With the need for larger barrel bombs and the Syrian military need for larger explosions there is reason to believe that the military could be using these auxiliary fuel tanks as Fuel Air Explosives(FAE).  There is no clear evidence of the military converting these fuel tanks to FAE'S but their appears to be very large unexplainable explosions in Syria that that are clearly made from unknown FAE weapons. If the military made these tanks into FAE'S and they were able to master the weaponization of deploying fuel and igniting it, these tanks would generate explosions greater then 15 tone TNT equivalent weights. One of these unexplainable explosions that has not been attributed to ground fuel explosions, fuel or high explosive depots or anything but a dropped bomb is shown in figure 14.  This unexplainable explosion distinctly shows that a FAE or fuel weapon was used in Syria that generated a fireball cloud diameter near 2000ft.  The TNT equivalent yield is estimated from the height of the dust cloud where many yield equations have been derived for nuclear and large explosive events in the 1960's. This explosion did not persist like known explosions that were started from fuel depots or fuel lines from conventional bombing. This explosion occurred and persisted for about 120 seconds and then disconnected from the ground.  Also, there have been several barrel bombs that have been observed from helicopters that appear to have platforms that are attached to wheel tracks.  These bombs would weigh over 3000lbs and would require some sled system to move it on and off the helicopter.

Figure 14 Potential Syrian Derived Weapon Which Supports Unexplainable Explosions

This explosion would generate significant damage to all buildings within a 600ft diameter. The analysis assumed the fuel is ethylene oxide which has and energy content of 28000J/g while TNT explosive is around 4180J/g.  This large increase in energy is another reason why the Syrian military may be investigating weaponizing auxiliary fuel tanks into FAE weapons.  It is known that Syria possess Russian ODAB 500 FAE weapons that only have a TNT equivalent yield of 1 tonne.

Aleppo barrel Bombs Attacks
It was reported that Syrian government aircraft dumped barrels packaged with explosives on at least four opposition-held neighbourhoods of Aleppo on Dec 18, 2013. This would be the fourth day of increased air strikes on this contested northern city. It appears this air campaign killed more than 100 people in the first three days alone.  A map of the potential barrel bombings is shown in figure 15.  The damage radius of these bombs looks very large from observing videos of the explosions.  In fact, it is still unclear if all 11 of these explosions is solely from barrel bombs.  The Syrian people have a history of calling all bombs dropped from helicopters barrel bombs, which is false. Their has been many reports that all these attacks are specifically barrel bombs but given the probability of success, this seems questionable and further analysis is requited. However, lets assume all 11 explosions were from barrel bombs and lets also assume that all 11 barrel bombs possessed fuse wicks.  Since the probability of a fuse wick barrel bomb working is 25%, it would require around 88 barrel bomb drops to achieve 11 successful explosions based on the probability equation of \(\begin{equation} P=1-(1-P_{k/h})^n \end{equation}\)

Figure 15 Aleppo Bomb Impact Points From December 2013 Attacks

Figure 16 Large Barrel Bomb Filmed and appears on Internet On Dec 21, 2013

Figure 17 Close Up Of Barrel Bomb From Video

A guest post by Christopher Kingdon, founder of the SyrianCivilWar sub-Reddit.

Introduction

This analysis addresses the southeastern Otaibah and northeastern Adra offensives, which together constitute Phase I of the rebels’ “Battle of God is the Greatest and Most Honorable” in East Ghouta:

• How far south and west did the rebels reach in the Otaibah offensive?
• Which of the captured towns do they still hold?
• What divides the Adra offensive from the Otaibah offensive? 

Figure 1: State of Ghouta Siege on November 15th

As Joshua Landis writes, “No mention is made of the newly announced Islamic Front. In this major battle driving regime forces from a large part of the Ghouta Ahrar al-Sham, let by Hassan Aboud is identified with Jabhat al-Nusra, the al-Qaida affiliate. Jaysh al-Islam, which is led by Zahran Alloush is identified independently of Ahrar. This suggests that the Islamic Front alliance announced in November has not taken root, at least not yet.”

In the footage dump on December 16th, the rebels claim to have captured 40 square kilometers of East Ghouta (pretty accurate), killed 800 government soldiers (certainly inflated; the footage doesn’t show anywhere near that number, but heavy losses were definitely inflicted on government troops), destroyed 23 vehicles and captured 44 (once again, almost certainly inflated, but some government vehicles were destroyed and others were captured).      

After the footage dump on December 16th, it’s evident that the rebels deployed at least one self-propelled anti-air mount, (a ZSU-23-4 [Shilka]), several tanks, at least one BMP, and a variety of homemade and imported anti-tank weaponry. Scott Lucas of EAWorldView writes that Shilkas evidenced in some of the videos could offer some protection from aerial attacks.


Now I turn to the geography of the offensive.

Al-Bilaliya, البلالية

Al-Bilaliya was on the front lines of the Ghouta siege throughout late October and much of November. On October 30th, Dimasqh Now reported government shelling on Al-Bilaliya.  On November 2nd the FSA military council of Damascus released a statement that al Bilaliyah was exposed to government attack. Between November 11th and November 19th, videos purported to show Jabhat al Nusra shelling government troops around Al-Bilaliya suggesting that government forces were fighting in the area of the town.

On November 23rd, Ak-Saler News reported that the rebels had gained control of Al-Bilaliyah. This was confirmed in the December 16th video dump with footage purporting to show the rebels fighting in the town, destroying a government outpost, and finally, a graphic video showing dead government troops. Since then, there have been no reports of the government recapturing the city. It can be concluded that the rebels still hold the town as of December 21st.

Qaysa, قيسا

On the 22nd of November, an official Jabhat al Nusra Twitter account @JbhatAlNusra, asserted that the group had seized the town of Qaysa. Qaysa is located southeast of Al-Bilaliya.  Footage from the December 16th video dump shows the rebels walking on the outskirts of Qaysa. A report from Slab News on November 28th claimed that the clashes in Qaysa had divided the town ‘two halves’. It appears that the rebels presumably never fully held the town of Qaysa, but only a northern portion.

On November 24th, a National Defense Force video showed NDF forces attempting to push north from Harran al Awamid against the rebel positions in Qaysa.


Harran al Awamid is located a few kilometers south of Qaysa. The report stated: “We are currently going in the direction of Bahariah. To support the SAA against the armed militants: takfiris. Military operations still continue. The military command assures the civilians are evacuated while they are sterilizing the area of terror. This group is on its way to Bahariah. We do of course have forces inside. We will reinforce them so we can repel the attack.”

On December 10th, SANA claimed to have regained control of Qaysa and to have ‘restored security and stability to it’, though there has been no visual evidence to support these claims. Considering the only primary evidence provided by the rebels was from the outskirts of the town, and that government claims to have retaken the town come from SANA, it can be concluded that the government has probably recaptured Qaysa.

Deir Salman, al-Qasimiyah, Abbadeh and Al-Bahariyah

On November 24th, Etilaf.org released a statement, entitled “FSA and Islamic Front Advance on Regime Forces in Eastern Ghouta,” which stated: “The Free Syrian Army and the Islamic Front captured the towns of Al-Bahariyah, Qasimiyah, Abbadeh and Deir Salman in Eastern Ghouta after fierce clashes with Assad Forces with reports of regime losses.” The statement further stated: “clashes are still going on in the town of Otaibah.”

Figure 5: Rebel Gains, December 5th

Deir Salman, دير سلمان

The rebels reportedly captured Deir Salman on November 22nd. Footage released in the December 16th footage dump showed the rebels celebrating at the center of Deir Salman as well as another clip showing a rebel tank and infantry destroying a government building. A further video shows rebels storming a government building as it burns.

However on December 19th rebel pages reported a heavy government bombardment rocket and artillery bombardment. On December 20th government pages and Arab news outlets claimed that the town had been recaptured. Starting with Al Hadath News, then Slab News and Al Nour.  An Al Manar reporter, Sonar Hatem, also made the same claim on Twitter. Visual evidence has not yet been provided of these claims, but they were consistently carried in news outlets and on pro-government social media pages.

Until more evidence emerges, the situation in Deir Salman should be considered to be in flux, but it is very possible that the government has regained the town.

Al-Qasimiyah, قرية الجربا

Located northeast of Deir Salman is Al-Qasimiyah. Al-Qasimiyah was reported captured on November 24th.  On December 16th, footage was released showing the rebels entering the town, a graphic video of dead government soldiers in Qasimiyah, the rebels storming a compound, and one rebel celebrating while claiming that they held the town. The local media page, Coordinating Qasimiyah, continued to report the rebels held the town as of December 17th, and there is currently no counter-claim from the government to have retaken the city. It is likely that the rebels still hold the town as of December 21st.

Jarba, قرية الجربا

Jarba, located northeast of Al-Qasimiyah, was another town reported captured on November 24th.
On December 3rd, in an exception to the media blackout, the rebels released a short video showing their presence in Jarba outside a damaged mosque. On December 16th, this was confirmed with the release of footage of the rebels celebrating in Jarba. The local Facebook page is inactive, but there have been no government counter-claims of retaking the town. It is therefore likely, once again, that the rebels still hold the town as of December 21st.

Al-Bahariyah, البحارية

Located slightly north of Jarba is Al-Bahariyah. The rebels initially reported on November 22nd to have captured the town, which can now be tentatively confirmed with footage available. Other footage released mid-December shows the rebels fighting in the town with tanks and another clips shows captured government positions. There are no government counter-claims to have recaptured the city. So it is likely that the rebels still control the town as of December 21st.

Abbadeh, العبادة

Abbadeh is located northeast of Qaysa, slightly southeast of Jarba and directly northwest of Otaibah. On December 16th, old footage was released of rebels celebrating and walking through Abbadeh corroborating their November 24th claim. Another graphic video seems to show dead government soldiers, while yet another shows an Islamist flag flying over Abbadeh.

On December 7th, the government claimed to have ‘confront(ed) terrorists’ in Abbadeh, but there have been no claims of the town being fully recaptured from the government.  Yet again it can be concluded that the rebels are still in control of the town of Abbadeh.

Otaibah, قرية العتيبة

The furthest eastern extent of the Otaibah offensive seems to have been when the rebels briefly entered the western outskirts of the town of Otaibah. Otaibah is located here.

On December 2nd, rebels released a video showing a group of rebels at a key junction 1KM from the city center. Footage from the December 16th footage dump also shows the rebels fighting on the outskirts of Otaibah.

Soon after, SANA news agency reported that the army had “restored security and stability to al-Eteibeh area and its surrounding in eastern Ghouta in Damascus countryside after eliminating an armed terrorist group that infiltrated the area few days ago.” In conjunction with this claim, the NDF released a video showing them inside Otaibah. Evidently the government has regained control of Otaibah.

The Curious Case of Mayda’a, ميدعا

Sitting north of Al-Bahariya and south of a government base, Brigade 39, is the town of Mayda’a. On October 19th, Fars News reported, “The source underlined that only Meyda’a region has remained to be cleaned up of militants, adding that the only supply route to the rebels in Eastern Ghouta now passes through this region.” The claim that the rebels had a supply route through Mayda’a is unverifiable elsewhere, but it can be evidenced that the rebels held Mayda’a before the Otaibah. On September 15th the Sham News Network reported the government shelled the town. On September 28th the local LCC reported that the government launched an air strike on the town. On October 15th Sham News Network reported government shelling of the town. It is unlikely that the government was shelling its own positions, so it appears that the rebels had been in control of Mayda’a since early September, subsequently confirmed by a Damascus source. Taken in conjunction with the October 19th report, it would seem that the rebels held Mayda’a when they launched the Otaibah offensive. As there have been no reports of the government recapturing Mayda’a as of December 19th, it would appear that the rebels still hold Mayda’a.

Figure 8: Map of East Ghouta as of December 21st

Summary 

During Phase I, as of early December, the rebels had captured Al Bilaliya, Deir Salman, Qasimiyah, Abbadeh and Al-Bahariyah in full and parts of Otaibah and Qaysa. Since then, it is likely that the government has recaptured the Otaibah outskirts it lost, as well as Deir Salman and the parts of Qaysa that the rebels briefly took.

It can be tentatively concluded that currently the southern line of this Otaibah front runs along the southern tips of Al Bhilaliyah to Qasimiyah and then Abbadeh. The western front sits at the west of Abbadeh and runs vertically upwards along the western portions of Jarba, Al Bahariyah and Mayda’a. Sitting above Mayda’a, the government base, Brigade 39, severs the Otaibah front from the Adra Front.

The Adra Offensive

What is the situation in Adra?

On December 11th, the rebels launched an offensive on Adra. A week after the December 5th rebel claim from Otaibah, rebel activists claimed the Adra offensive represents the latter part of the Phase I offensive in East Ghouta. The Adra offensive appears to have been launched from the direction of Duma, the northeastern-most city in the rebel Ghouta pocket. On December 13th, pro-government activist Syrian Perspective created a map showing the rebels having made gains up to Baghdad Bridge to the northwest, Aard al Jullah to the north and As Safariyah town to the southeast of Adra.

On December 12th Lorientle Journal reported that the Syrian government had launched a counter-offensive. The key for the government was reestablishing control of the main road leading out of Damascus. There was, and continues to be, heavy fighting in the area. The Adra offensive seems to be a much bigger concern to the government than the Otaibah offensive.

On December 15th, the Syrian Army retook Baghdad Bridge. This has also been confirmed by a source in Damascus. On the same day Fars News reported government successes in neighborhoods to the north of Adra. On December 19th, the government further reported retaking forty blocks of Adra back from the rebels. On December 21st, RT Arabic reported that the Syrian Army had severed rebel supply routes to Adra. This matches the map by Syrian Perspective from December 21st, which showed the government had severed the Adra pocket from Duma. However rebels are reporting significant success in Adra, and two Jabhat al Nusra suicide bombers struck on December 21st, so the precise situation in Adra remains less clear than in Otaibah.

While the situation is clearly in flux, the government does seem to be making inroads to rebel gains; however, so far, the rebels continue to hold the center of Adra.

Summary  
       
The Otaibah front struck southeast from Al-Bilaliyah to the outskirts of Otaibah with the initial offensive taking seven towns. The offensive has opened up a broader front in southeastern Ghouta for the rebels to potentially access from the outside with supplies (precariously). The government has counter-attacked taking the outskirts of Otaibah and possibly the towns of both Deir Salman and Qaysa.
Was Phase I a decisive victory for the rebels?

It is a hard question to answer as it remains unclear exactly what is going on; opinions differ depending on whom you ask. Clearly the rebels captured a considerable area including at least seven towns, inflicting losses some degree of government losses and securing a substantial amount of government armor.

But did the rebels break a clear corridor through the siege?

No.

Certainly their southeastern front is now broader and more accessible than it was before Phase I, but the government’s recapture of the towns of Qaysa, Deir Salman and parts of Otaibah, combined with their string of air defense and army bases to the east of East Ghouta mean that rebels still have very little free movement. Evidently the rebels’ failure to secure Otaibah in full and the government success in retaking the parts lost dampens the rebels’ elation after Phase I. However it is clear that overall the rebels gained more than they lost in this offensive and certainly improved their situation if compared to the situation prior to Phase I.  The rebels have clearly improved their situation in East Ghouta significantly ahead of the Geneva II Peace Conference, not that any of the groups participating in these offensives have committed to attend.

As for the Adra offensive, it is too early to predict the results. The government’s swift counter-offensive has enjoyed some significant success. If the RT reports are true and the rebel supply lines from Duma have been severed, this would not bode well for the rebels left in a small pocket in Adra. It should be noted that the Adra counter-offensive seems to have received a much more concentrated counter-effort from the government than Otaibah. That said, the rebels still hold most of Adra and show no signs of retreating. Both sides claim heavy losses.

On December 21st very unconfirmed reports began to circulate from jihadist accounts that the rebels had begun Phase II in Damascus, titled “Enter the Door.”

Part one of this series can be found here.

6 - Abu Sakkar

Probably the most notorious video of the conflict so far, the video posted online in May showed a member of the Syrian opposition, Abu Sakkar, stating that "we will eat your hearts and your livers, you soldiers of Bashar the dog!", then cutting out an organ from the corpse on the ground, and biting down on it.  There's many edited versions of the video online, here's an example of one of them


One thing that's interesting to note is the video that appeared online was actually edited before it was even posted.  Supposedly, the edited video was sent to pro-government groups as a threat, but earlier versions seen by various organisations also included direct threats to Alawites that were apparently removed before the video was sent out.

The media storm that followed this video was quite unique for any video coming from Syria, and Abu Sakkar rapidly became the poster boy for anti-opposition sentiments, with one individual's act being used to paint the opposition as "cannibal rebels", even by Russian President Vladimir Putin, who stated "one does not really need to support the people who not only kill their enemies, but open up their bodies, eat their intestines in front of the public and cameras".  In the media storm that followed, Abu Sakkar even felt the need to justify his actions, claiming images on the dead man's phone of rape and child killing had been his motivation, and telling the BBC "I didn't want to do this. I had to.  We have to terrify the enemy, humiliate them, just as they do to us. Now, they won't dare be wherever Abu Sakkar is.".

Whatever motivation or justification Abu Sakkar claimed, in the public imagination he came to represent the darkest elements of the Syrian opposition, and the increasingly extreme nature of the conflict.

5 - Chasing White Grenades In Saraqeb

While many people who know my blog are no doubt very familiar with my work on the August 21st Sarin attack in Damascus, what many people are unaware of is my equally obsessive investigation into another alleged chemical attack in the town of Saraqeb, Idlib, on April 29th. One particularly unusual element of the attack was the delivery method, which was reportedly white grenades, as shown below


France had received samples from the scene of the attack which they claimed contained evidence of Sarin. Despite that, so many different details of the attack didn't make sense to me.  From piecing together various pieces of evidence (which I detailed here) I discovered the method of attack was claimed to be two white grenades, placed inside a breeze/cinder-block (the remains of which can be see here), which was then dropped from a helicopter, with the grenades apparently producing smoke as they fell.  This didn't seem to make sense if it was a Sarin attack; the grenades would have produced heat while producing smoke, and as Sarin is heat-sensitive it would have degrading the Sarin; the scale of the attack was tiny on areas with no obvious military value; and all-in-all it seemed like the most inefficient, awkward, and potentially self-endangering way of using Sarin.

In fact, I would have almost have dismissed the attack if it wasn't for another alleged Sarin attack two weeks earlier in Sheikh Maqsoud, Aleppo.  Again, there were reports of grenades dropped from helicopters, a small number of causalities, and photographs showing the same type of white grenade surrounded by the remains of what appears to be a disintegrated breeze/cinder-block.


To add to the confusion, a Jabhat al-Nusra member was photographed with the same type of grenade, and that led to the journalist Alfred Hackensberger hunting for the grenades in Syria, where he discovered most people knew them as just plain smoke grenades.

After that the trail went cold, with no more attacks using this unusual method reported, and I was inclined to think that the attacks were possibly not Sarin at all, but something else.  It wasn't until the final UN report on the use of chemical weapons was published that the agent used in the attack was possibly identified.  One victim of the Saraqeb was taken to Turkey, and her corpse was made available for testing to the investigation team.  They discovered her organs had traces of Sarin in them, and this seemed to strongly point towards Sarin being used in Saraqeb. While the report had little to say on Sheikh Maqsoud attack, it seems not unreasonable to assume the same chemical agent was used.

The question is then, why?  As I said before, the attacks were executed in a very unusual fashion, seemed capable of resulting in small numbers of causalities, and were on targets with no obvious military value.  So the question remains, why did the Syrian military go to the risk of delivering Sarin in such a self-endangering and seemingly pointless manner?

4 - Qatar, Sudan, China, And Missiles

Croatian weapons weren't the only arms smuggled to the Syrian opposition in 2013.  In February, a couple of months after the first sighting of Croatian weapons, Chinese FN-6 MANPADS (MAN Portable Air Defence Systems) started to appear in the east of the country


At the time it was unclear exactly where they had come from.  It was considered highly unlikely that the Western powers involved in the conflict would sign off on MANPADS being supplied to a fractured opposition, so one theory was they came from an as yet unknown stock of weapons supplied to the Syrian government by China.  However, several months later, the New York Times revealed Sudan had been selling the FN-6 MANPADS to Qatar, who had been supplying them to the opposition.  In fact, it also appears other Chinese weapons havd been provided by Sudan to Qatar, including Chinese HJ-8E ATGMs (Anti-Tank Guided Missiles), M99 anti-materiel rifles, QLZ-87 automatic grenade launchers, and other weapons.

Much like the Croatian weapons smuggling, this goes to show that YouTube can be the starting point of investigations that can uncover all sorts of newsworthy information.

A guest post by Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi.

Introduction

It is generally held that the ideology of Arab nationalism is virtually dead. At the governmental level, this assertion mostly holds true, with the Fatah-led regime of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank being the last real representative of old ideals of pan-Arab unity. However, on the ground, traditional Arab nationalists may be found in all the countries of the Middle East and North Africa. As it turns out, they have formed their own volunteer militia force to fight in Syria on behalf of the Assad regime: the Arab Nationalist Guard.

Figure 1: Emblem of the Arab Nationalist Guard.

A manifesto put out by an Arab Nationalist Guard activist of Egyptian origin explains the basics of the group’s existence as follows: “The Arab Nationalist Guard is a military resistance movement currently operating in the Syrian Arab Republic, established in April 2013 by a group of Arab Nationalist Youth from many Arab countries, currently including four battalions bearing the names of martyred leaders: Wadih Haddad, Haydar al-Amali, Mohamed Brahmi, and Jules Jammal. In total there are 50 resisting Arab battalions.”

Here, an explanation ought to be given of the significance of the names. Mohamed Brahmi was a secular Tunisian politician who founded the Arab nationalist and socialist People’s Movement after the overthrow of dictator Ben Ali in the Tunisian Revolution. He was subsequently assassinated by Islamists in July of this year.

Wadih Haddad was a Palestinian Christian and Arab nationalist militant in the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, responsible for organizing plane hijackings in the late 1960s and 1970s. Jules Jammal was a legendary Syrian Arab Christian naval officer who supposedly sank a French ship during the Suez War in defense of Egypt for the cause of Arab nationalism, subject to much eulogy thereafter. Hayder al-Amali was a prominent modern Arab nationalist thinker and politician of Lebanese origin who died in 2007.

Ideology

The group’s ideology, as can be inferred from the name, falls in line with traditional pan-Arab sentiments, with notions of Arab unity and anti-imperialism: “The Arab Nationalist Guard espouses Arab nationalist ideals, believing in the existence of a single Arab ummah, and the necessity of liberating and uniting it in a single political entity gathering all Arabs away from any sectarian, ethnic, or religious extremism; and thus is the necessity of confronting Zionism and colonialist trends that threaten the Arab nation with even more division than the current partition, exploitation of its resources and colonization.”

Concomitant with these ideals is an adoption of the Assad regime’s rhetoric. Thus the Arab Nationalist Guard emphasizes the need also “to confront all Takfiri movements that aim to strike our unity and aim to sow division.” Indeed, “As a result of the ideas of the Arab Nationalist Guard, there is participation in the defense of the Syrian Arab Republic, preserving its unity and supporting it in confronting the colonialist project that threatens it with internal collaborator Arab tools with Zionist-American support declaring an attempt to break Syrian bravery.” The group also unsurprisingly stresses the necessity of liberating Palestine.

The Arab Nationalist Guard reflects its ideology in imagery circulated on social media. Particular reverence is accorded to the 20th century’s foremost representative of the ideology of Arab nationalism: namely, Gamal Abdel Nasser, who in the Syrian context of pan-Arabism is particularly relevant on account of his project of the United Arab Republic (UAR): a union between Syria and Egypt in the period 1958-61 that used the same flag as that of the Assad regime in Syria today.

Other groups and figures that stand out for praise include late President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela (as a supposed symbol of anti-imperialism), Hezbollah (in keeping with the image of resistance to the West etc.), Saddam Hussein (for similar reasons) and of course, Bashar al-Assad.

Figure 2: Graphic in Arab Nationalist Guard circles commemorating Gamal Abdel Nasser, featuring an eagle symbolizing the flag of the UAR/Syria.

Figure 3: Another Arab Nationalist Guard graphic commemorating Gamal Abdel Nasser and the UAR: “The Northern Region: Damascus- The United Arab Republic- Cairo: The Southern Region.”

Figure 4: One of many photos circulated in Arab Nationalist Guard social media featuring demonstrations for Palestine.

The Arab Nationalist Guard maintains links with the activist networks- by the name “Arab Nationalist Youth”- from which it draws recruits in a number of locations. Some of the more prominent places where Arab Nationalist Youth activity can be found include Sidon in Lebanon, Gaza and Egypt.

Figure 5: “Arab Nationalist Youth” event for Eid al-Fitr in Sidon in August. Note the identical logo to the Arab Nationalist Guard indicating that the Arab Nationalist Youth is simply the activist wing.

Figure 6: A young female activist for the Arab Nationalist Youth at the Eid event in Sidon.

Figure 7: Group photo for the Arab Nationalist Youth in Sidon.

Figure 8: Arab Nationalist Youth activists featured in some of the anti-Morsi demonstrations in Egypt at the end of June.

Figure 9: Arab Nationalist Youth activists in Gaza, December 2012.

Operations of the Arab Nationalist Guard in Syria

According to an Arab Nationalist Youth activist and subsequent fighter for the Arab Nationalist Guard, alternating his time between Sidon and Damascus, the Arab Nationalist Guard’s membership includes Arab nationalists from a variety of countries, including Egypt and Iraq.

At the same time, he claimed to me that the group has “fighters from all Syrian sects and welcomes all ethnicities of the Ummah from Arabs, Kurds and Amazigh (the Arab Maghreb) because we nationalists believe that the land is for all in it and we distance ourselves from chauvinism.” This apparent openness contrasts a great deal with Arab nationalist regimes’ actual historical record with regards to Kurdish and Berber minorities, whether Saddam Hussein’s Iraq or Muammar al-Qaddafi’s Libya (both figures revered in these circles anyway).

My contact added that the Arab Nationalist Guard, which cooperates closely with the Syrian army and the National Defense Force militia, operates in a number of areas of Syria, including Damascus, Deraa, Homs and Aleppo governorates. From the open-source evidence that has emerged, it would appear that Damascus province is the primary region of focus for the Arab Nationalist Guard, playing a role in the recent regime offensive on the Qalamoun area. Other areas of operation in Damascus province I have been able to identify- barring those mentioned in the photos below- encompass Mazara’ al-Qasimiya and Hatita al-Turkoman.

Figure 10: Arab Nationalist Guard fighters of the Mohamed Brahmi battalion in Qalamoun, Damascus province.

Figure 11: Arab Nationalist Guard members engage in outreach to locals in the regime stronghold of Jaramana, Damascus, during a funeral for one of its fighters.

Figure 12: Arab Nationalist Guard fighters in Damascus.

Figure 13: Screenshot from a video claiming Arab Nationalist Guard participation in the regime’s capture of as-Sabina al-Kubra in Damascus countryside in early November. Note that this video was set to the song “Fire your Guns, Show No Mercy” by pro-Hezbollah Lebanese Christian singer Julia Boutros.

Figure 14: Screenshot of Arab Nationalist Guard fighters from the same video.

Figure 15: Arab Nationalist Guard militiamen in an unknown location in Syria, but most likely Damascus province again.

Figure 16: Arab Nationalist Guard fighter in Damascus province.

Figure 17: Scenes of fighting in the areas of Damascus from an Arab Nationalist Guard video. Noteworthy is mention of participation in fighting in the district of Barza near the main city.

Martyrs

The Arab Nationalist Guard has its own claimed martyrs but sources connected to the group are unwilling to name many for “security reasons.” The same reason lies behind vagueness on areas of operation outside of Damascus province. Below are the most notable cases.

Figure 18: Aamer Eid Abdullah- “Abu Nasir”- “martyred in defense of the unity and nobility of the Syrian Arab Republic.” An Egyptian killed fighting in Qalamoun in November.

Figure 19: Scene from Jaramana for the November funeral of Arab Nationalist Guard commander Ahmad Othman (Abu Bakr al-Masri), originally from Cairo. Note the placard featuring Assad alongside Gamal Abdel Nasser.