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A Year Of Conflict In Syria In Ten Videos - 3 to 1

December 31, 2013, 7:22 am
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Earlier parts of this series can be found here and here.

3 - The "Hezbollah" Execution Video

At this stage in the conflict, execution videos are a fairly regular occurrence, but there was one video that reflected a significant change in the conflict, as well as demonstrating the value of open source research (graphic)


The above video was posted online, with many claiming it showed Hezbollah fighters in Syria executing captured and wounded opposition fighters.  In a pair of blog posts (here and here) Phillip Smyth of Jihadology.net, who has specialised in studying Shia militias involvement in the conflict, investigated the video, and discovered a variety of different online sources that confirmed that these were Shia militia in Syria, although not specifically Hezbollah as some claimed.

For me this represents two things; the increasing involvement of Shia groups with fighting inside Syria as the conflict becomes increasingly sectarian; and the way in which open source information can be used to confirm the authenticity of images, and provide related information that's incredibly useful in understand the nature of conflict.

2 - The IRAM Mystery Solved

One thing I always like to stress when talking about using open source information like YouTube videos is there's a big difference between evidence and proof.  It's possible to collect plenty of evidence that supports a theory, but finding proof that theory is correct can be a different matter.

There's one munition that was something of a mystery, first spotted in October 2012.  These munitions, which at the time were called IRAMs (Improved Rocket Assisted Munitions), were 107mm artillery rockets, as used by the common Type-63 multiple rocket launcher, with the warhead replaced with a much larger warhead.  Whenever they appeared, it was claimed they were being fired at opposition forces by government forces, but some questioned that claim due to their apparent improvised nature.  I had collected a couple of dozen videos showing unexploded examples, but after nearly year I hadn't seen anything that could prove they were used by the government.

Thanks to the unique access of ANNA News to government forces, proof finally appeared on August 30th, when the below video showed IRAMs being loaded and fired by government forces (1:15)


In fact, all of a sudden there seemed to be plenty of the proof I had been looking for appearing online.  Aside from the above video, opposition forces captured the munitions at Khanasser near Aleppo, and the Syrian National Defence Force posted a video on their YouTube channel showing one in action.  Eventually I was even able to find out the name for the munitions, "Volcanoes", which as the next video demonstrates started another mystery.

1 - Everyone's Favourite Volcano

As anyone who is even vaguely familiar with this blog will know, I've spent a lot of time looking at the August 21st Sarin attack, in particular the munitions used, which shares the name "Volcano" with the IRAM type munition described above.  This was another example of having evidence, but not proof, that the government was using them, until one video was posted online by the Syrian National Defence Force


This video shows the same family of munitions linked to the August 21st Sarin attack being loaded into a single barrel launcher.  Continued investigation after the August 21st attack has uncovered evidence that's there's two different types of launchers, and two different sizes, this single barrel launcher firing the larger size.  The smaller twin-barrel launcher is seen at the start of this video of government forces filmed by Al Mayadeen TV, matching the type filmed repeatedly at Mezzeh airbase back in December 2012.

What's interesting about the above video posted by the NDF is how that particular video spread among different groups.  This video from the Damascus based SAMA TV shows the munition in action, a Facebook post (now deleted) about the munitions on a pro-Hezbollah page described them as "The pride of Lebanese industry", a Iraqi Shia Facebook group posted a fact sheet about them, and a recent video from Hezbollah sources features the NDF video heavily.  It's also interesting to note that it appears these videos from government sources only started to appear online after the threat of military action has subsided, even though there's evidence of them being used since late 2012.

There's still a lot to learn about these munitions, only recently have we had the best estimate for their range provided by Richard Lloyd and Ted Postol in the New York Times, and there's plenty more to be discovered, and it's likely that as with much of the information gathered on the munition so far, that'll be through open source information.  
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Syria's Sahwa: A Battle of Confusion

January 12, 2014, 12:45 pm
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A guest post by Pieter Van Ostaeyen.

Syria's war, waging for almost three years now, seems to have reached a new level. Since the early summer of 2013 "al-Qaeda" ruled the media. A strong presence on social media showed us that Jabhat al-Nusra (the official al-Qaeda branch in Syria) and ad-Dawla al-Islāmiyya fī al-Irāq wa's-Shām (known as ISIS, the Islamic State in Iraq and as-Shām) were not only waging full scale war against the Syrian regime, but also were clashing with objective allies.  Fighting FSA and Kurdish forces in Rojava was obviously expected but after a while ISIS was getting accused of attacking member groups of the Islamic Front. And vice versa, Harakat Ahrār as-Shām, for example, lost several of its foreign fighters. A Belgian and aTunisian member of ISIS got killed near a checkpoint; news came out early December.

But the incident that seems to have triggered the current events (which can be described as the first signs of Syrian Sahwa or uprising)  must have been the torture and murder of a Harakat Ahrār as-Shām member, Doctor Husayn as-Sulaymān Abū Rayyān. His body was released in a prisoner exchange. Pictures of his mutilated body circulated widely on social media. A statement about Abū Rayyān in Arabic can be read here.  This and other recent violent clashes between ISIS and other rebel groups, unleashed unseen infighting in Syria.

In a few days time close to 700 casualties were reported by Jihādī sources. In about a week there were 16 suicide attacks targeting rebel forces. There are, obviously, no independent sources on these numbers. Rumors are spreading, and have been confirmed in some cases, that foreign fighters have been targeted more than ever. The last few days the most striking would be the abduction of two Belgian teenage girls.  Another report claimed that three Dutch girls were abducted and raped. ISIS seems to be disintegrating in some areas. A contact in Idlib province ( Sunday January 5): "The place is swarming with lost ISIS-fighters ... There's utter chaos ... Some were arrested, some want to secure their families, others prefer to keep on fighting. In some regions Jabhat an-Nusra just took over ISIS strongholds without firing a single shot." Later that day he contacted me again: "There are no more Dawla fighters where I am, Jabhat an-Nusra, Harakat Ahrār as-Shām and FSA took it all. A lot of these boys are now in hiding, because Jaysh al-Mujāhidīn are now arresting all ISIS-fighters and Muhājirīn [foreign fighters]."

In the first few days there was some confusion whether or not Harakat Ahrār as-Shām was involved in the clashes with ISIS, but my contact was clear about that, from day one they were. And hereby the devils were unleashed. The days that followed my Twitter timeline got flooded with accusations, quite quickly there were two camps calling each other names. Some people went berserk and started a true war of words. The name calling and slander were unprecedented; even compared to what happened before between the Kurds and ISIS the tone of voice hardened. And literally all got dragged in, Jabhat an-Nusra for example; some British ISIS fighter stated: "Jabhat an-Nusra in Raqqa attacked us but Jabhat in Badiya gave us a car for free packed with a heavy machine gun. Confusing ?Most certainly." When I informed my contact about what was going on, he reacted firmly "Are they officially at war ? No ! So what's the point saying such things on Twitter ? Some Nusra guys I know left for Aleppo to protect the families of the Dawla-fighters. They should post that on Twitter."

In the meanwhile it became clear that the leadership of Jabhat an-Nusra and ISIS were bound to react to clear the fog of war. And as expected the first official reaction came from Jabhat an-Nusra's leader Abū Muhammad al-Jūlānī.  In an audio recording that was released by Jabhat an-Nusra's official account he made an offer to negotiate between the clashing factions.  Al-Jūlānī blamed ISIS though for the fighting between Muslims, an example he referred to was the captivity of Jabhat an-Nusra's local leader in ar-Raqqa. To solve the infighting Jabhat an-Nusra formed a committee all groups should join , an independent Sharī'a court should settle the issues. For, if the infighting continues, "we will loose a great battlefield of Jihād."

It only took a few hours before ISIS answered with it's own lengthy statement. Although it took their spokesman, Abū Muhammad al-'Adnānī, 37 minutes to bring his message, it can be summarized as Charles Lister put it in one of his recent articles: "We have armies in Iraq and an army in Syria full of hungry lions who drink blood and eat bones, finding nothing tastier than the blood of Sahwa." This message can clearly be seen as an open declaration of war towards the SNC and SMC. He refers to them as the allies of Jewish and Crusader forces, a quite often used rhetoric. He further calls upon his men to protect the foreign fighters, as they are the main victims of the Sahwa.

And indeed,  as one British fighter put it; "It breaks my heart to know that the people, who in the first place left the comfort of this Dunya, now have to flee out of Syria away from Jihād. My heart is broken. Even though I disagree with ISIS in many things,the hate they are met with today is unbearable. They are my brothers." In the meantime, the infighting and battle of words linger on, it is unneeded to state that Syria's war has reached a new phase. Where this will leave ISIS, for now, is open for speculation but it's likely to result in a weakening of the whole rebellion. Meanwhile al-Assad stands by, gloating to see his enemies fighting amongst themselves.

More of Pieter Van Ostaeyen's work can be found on his blog.
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Syrian Biological Weapons Capability

January 30, 2014, 12:36 pm
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By Hamish de Bretton Gordon, director at the London based CBRN consultancy SecureBio and former commander of the UK’s specialist CBRN Regiment.

On 29 Jan 14 James Clapper, Director National Intelligence, released a statement saying “We judge that some elements of Syria’s biological warfare program might have advanced beyond the research and development stage and might be capable of limited agent production, based on the duration of its longstanding program,”.  This news appeared to have shocked a number of western agencies and shed new light on to, what was viewed as, a hitherto un-disclosed Syrian capability.  However, this announcement should come as no surprise, after all biological weapons are the oldest form of WMD and often referred to as the “poor mans nuke”.  More worryingly why was this such a revelation, the information has been in the public domain since at least 2007 and SecureBio have included it in our specialist chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear training and awareness package since 2012.

The UN agreement, drawn up in October, to remove Assad’s weapons of mass destruction and the subsequent Syrian declaration was notably light on any mention of biological weapons, despite a report in 2007 indicating that Syria possessed a number of Category A pathogens, including Anthrax, Plague, Tularemia, Botulinium, Smallpox, Aflotoxin, Cholera, Ricin and Camelpox.  Category A pathogens are considered the most toxic biological compounds, as an example 1 gram of crystalline Botulinium is assessed to be sufficient to kill about a million people, if dispersed under optimal conditions.

Syria’s Biological Weapons (BW) programme, centered at the technically advanced Scientific Studies and Research Centre (SSRC) near Damascus, like many other nations, has its origins in the pharmaceutical and agricultural sectors, of which (pre-war) Syria provided 90% of the pharmaceuticals in the region. In order to effectively inoculate and protect individuals and livestock from the various endemic diseases, such as Anthrax (which is rife in the region), live pathogens are cultured and grown within a controlled laboratory.
These laboratories vary significantly in technology, with the SSRC being considered relatively modern, through to improvised laboratories in tin shacks on the outskirts of Kabul, which were used to produce veterinary strain vaccines in 2001.  The growing of biological cultures enables scientists to produce effective vaccines, which can be used to provide inoculation from disease and deliver defensive medical counter measures to first responders, at risk individuals and of course the military.

Despite good intentions, the more advanced scientific research and development facilities (such as SSRC) are easily and readily adapted to deliver a dual-use, defensive medical and offensive military capability, whilst remaining hidden from foreign intelligence assets. Dual-use facilities have the ability to grow live pathogens and then at a very late stage, separate them into vaccine strains and the more potent strains suitable for BW agents.

Consequently, it is entirely probable that the Syrian facilities will have acquired and developed their pharmaceutical industry quite legitimately however, at a later stage blurred the lines and opted to develop dual-use technologies; obtaining proof of this illegal development requires physical inspections by technically competent bodies and regime cooperation, something which has been absent from Syria for many years.
Based on Syria’s previous (and current) alliances and the assessed list of biological agents, it is likely that in addition to obtaining samples and cultures from endemic bacteria and viruses, much of the dual-use biological pathogens and technology will have originated in Russia, Iran and the DPRK.  Despite the sharing of bio-scientific information, the development of dual-use facilities and the growing of category A pathogens, it is should be noted that this is still only half the battle.

Once biological agents have been cultivated and grown, at dual-use sites, there is a significant step up in technology and scientific know-how required to transform the pathogens into a credible biological agent and then deliver them as a weapon. The programmes, to weaponise chemical, biological or radiological agents, are usually at the heart of a nation state’s most sensitive (or special) weapons sections, making it very difficult but not impossible to estimate how advanced they are.

The process of weaponising a biological agent is complex and multi-staged, involving enrichment, refining, toughening, milling and preparation of the pathogen.  These processes are designed to ensure that the biological agent survives the relatively traumatic experience of being fired from a rocket, dropped from an aircraft or post delivery exposed to harsh climatic conditions eg.  extremes of temperature, UV, wind, rain etc.  From James Clapper’s statement, it would appear that the US view the Syrian Biological Weapons programme as having successfully achieved this process and developed a viable delivery means, most probably as an aerosol, for its biological agents.  However, development of a biological weapons programme is one element, the development and refinement of biological agents is only of strategic value if the programme has the ability to scale up, ensuring sufficient stockpiles are maintained and that the agents can survive in long-term storage, through the use of climate controlled storage conditions, otherwise one rocket does represent a significant threat.

It would appear that there is little doubt about the accuracy of the US report or the inferred capabilities of the SSRC facility however, is the BW programme scalable and more importantly was it hardened against attack?  Let us not forget that last year the Israeli’s launched an air strike against the SSRC, which may have destroyed or at least reduced the capability of the Syrian BW programme.

Therefore, the question whether Syria possesses a legitimate BW programme is almost certainly yes, but the real question should be what capability remains after airstrikes and two years of civil war?

The final piece to the puzzle is how secure have these sites been over the past two years?  Biological agents are relatively easily identified, once deployed and symptoms begin to develop however, when in transit they are much more difficult to detect than chemical or radiological material. This difficulty in detection, coupled with the lack of internal security in Syria, presents a credible risk of biological proliferation from extremist groups.  These groups, through existing networks and knowledge, are more than capable of collecting and moving biological agents across international borders and delivering them, through improvised means, as a terror weapon; this a long aspired goal of Al Qaeda.

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Third Chemical Volcano Rocket Used On August 21st Geolocated

January 30, 2014, 1:21 pm
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Things have been rather quite on the blog recently while I work on a number of projects, including the launch of a new website.  One project I'm working on involves the August 21st Sarin attack, and while working on that project I've managed to geolocate one more potential impact sites from the August 21st Sarin attack in Damascus.

This task was made somewhat easier because I was able to contact the person who filmed the footage for this ITN report


He provided me with the GPS co-ordinates of what he filmed, and I was particularly interested in one site, which I've called Volcano 5 (playlist here).  This video shows what appears to be the impact site, and it appears the munition was removed from the site, leaving part of the warhead's outer shell, and the remains of a black rod device that has been sighted in a number of Volcano videos, but whose purpose is unclear


Because the munition is not present, we cannot be 100% sure this is an impact location, but I believe this area is worth geolocating on the chance it could be, and because it features in a number of videos and photographs, in particular focusing on one feature, a mound of dead animals


According to the GPS information I received, the location of the dead animals was in this area



The first image from this video shows the building to the south of the open area.


This building is partly built, and we can see from Google Earth historical satellite imagery this building construction appears to have begun between 2010 and 2011


Here we can see the ground floor juts out from the building, as it does in the video


At the bottom of this image we also see the building behind the newly constructed building that's visible in the video


The forth picture in this article shows the pile of dead animals, and is facing east.  On the map we can see the following 3 points of interest


At point 1 we can see a building at the corner of a walled area filled with trees.  The photograph shows a small building on the south corner, with another smaller building attached to it.  This matches what we have in the satellite image.

At point 2 there's a building visible in the photograph, and behind that at point 3 another building that juts out to the north, also visible in the photograph.

In this next video we have a view to the west


In this frame from the video it's possible to see a number of points of interest



At points 1 and 2 we can see the alleys to the west and south.  At point 3 we can see the building at the end of the west alley.  Behind that building is a taller building with balconies, visible in the historical map images of the area, marked with a 1 in the below image


Based off the above information, it seems very likely that this is the correct location, bringing the total number of Volcano rockets geolocated to three.


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Fourth Chemical Volcano Rocket Used On August 21st Geolocated

January 31, 2014, 2:09 pm
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Following on from yesterday's post on a third possible impact location of the chemical rockets used on August 21st I've been investigating more of the GPS co-ordinates provided to me by the local who filmed the video used in this ITN report


I now believe there is enough information to locate the position of the rocket I've dubbed Volcano 4 (playlist here).  One set of GPS co-ordinates pointed to this location


After reviewing video footage collected for the 8-9 Volcano rockets recorded after the attack, I believe this is almost certainly the location of Volcano 4.  The below clip shows a view to the west followed by a view to the east from two different videos.


Firstly, the location itself.  We can see to the north there's a brick wall which appears to have been pierced by the rocket, and in this image from Google Earth's historical satellite imagery we can see it's casting a shadow


In the satellite imagery it appears the building just west of the wall, on the north side, juts out to the south


In the video we can actually see it's only the top floor that juts out, while the ground floor is level with the wall


It's also noticeable that the building to the south is not parallel to the street, which can be seen on the satellite map



In the view east, we have a clear shot down the road


Satellite imagery shows a large multistorey building to the east, as visible in the above still


Although somewhat obscured in the video by greenery, the historical satellite imagery appears to show that the design of the building matches what we see in the video




Combined with the GPS data, I think this proves a strong match to Volcano 4.  What's also very interesting about this video is it appears the munition passed through the wall to the north, landing just south-east of the hole in the wall.


It's worth keeping in mind that just northwest of this position is a building that appears to be at least two storeys tall, so it's possible the munition could have deflected off the building.  However, it does seem likely the rocket would have come from the northwest.  I've created the following map showing the distance from the impact site, with the red line being 2km, yellow being 2.25km, and green being 2.5km.


It's worth noting the area south of the motorway running from the north to the west of the picture was the scene of Operaton al-Kabune, a government operation to secure a strip of land between Jobar and Qaboun, with the aim to encircle Jobar and Qaboun along the motorway running north to south in the above image.  That operation commenced on August 20th 2013 as part of Operation Capital Shield.


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How Facebook Is Destroying History - A Survey Of August 21st

February 7, 2014, 12:53 am
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This week, as Facebook celebrated it's tenth birthday, an article in The Atlantic highlighted another aspect of the Syrian conflict taking place on the pages of Facebook.  Many of us who study open source information relating to the conflict, such as YouTube and Facebook, frequently come across dead links to Facebook pages belonging to opposition groups and pro-government groups.  The Atlantic article points towards the deletion of opposition Facebook pages as being part of online campaigns run by pro-government groups
“We continue our reporting attacks,” read a typical post from December 9 on the SEA’s Facebook page. “Our next target is the Local Coordination Committee of Barzeh [a neighborhood in Damascus], the page that is a partner in shedding Syrian blood and provoking sectarian division.” It then provided two links to photos on the Barzeh page that could get the page taken down. Soon afterwards, the SEA removed its post as if it had never existed.
These deletions mean a vast amount of information is being lost, including initial reports of various events, photographs, and videos.  But how do we get a sense of how much information is being lost?

In recent weeks, I've been working on a project to gather and analyse all the information I can find relating to the August 21st Sarin attacks in Damascus.  This has included collecting a list of YouTube channels posting videos relating to the attacks, many of which have Facebook pages linked in the video descriptions.  To understand how much information is being lost, I've reviewed each channel, and detailed the status of their related Facebook pages below.

Abdullah Alshamy - No linked Facebook pages.
cmo algota - Three pages deleted, c.m.o.alghota, c.m.o.alghota2, c.m.o.alghota3
Coordinating Kvrbtna -  Current page, Coordinating.City.KafrBatna, created November 2013. Earlier page, kafrbatnasy, deleted.
Darya Revolution - Current page, D.M.C.Daryya, created January 2014. Earlier page, MCDDaryya, deleted.
erbeeni/erbin revo/erbinmedia1/MrERBEEN2011 - Current page, Erbinrevo2011, created November 2013.  Earlier page, erbin2011revolution, deleted.
Fadi Abdallah - No linked Facebook pages.
free syr - No linked Facebook pages.
HAMMORIAFOREVER - Hamoria.Revolution.Coordinating deleted.
Information Office of the consolidated city Arbin- No linked Facebook pages.
Jobar Revo - Jobar.Revolution deleted.
lcc douma - Douma.Revolution.lcc created in February 2013.
MajlesRifDimashq - No linked Facebook pages.
Mehmed - No linked Facebook pages.
Mohammed Saeed - No linked Facebook pages.
mrkzmoadamia alsham - Three pages deleted, Moadamiah.Revolution.News, mjles.moadamia4alll,
AlmrkzAlalamyLmdyntMdmytAlsham
Network is always free - Damascus - No linked Facebook pages.
SaqbaRevo0 - No linked Facebook pages.
Sham Media Foundation appeal- Foundation.Nidaa.Alsham created April 2013.

9 channels have no Facebook links.  7 are linked to Facebook pages that are now gone (some of which have new replacement pages created after August 21st), with 2 linked to existing Facebook pages.  That means 78% of Facebook pages that could have included initial report about the August 21st attack, and relevant photographs and videos, are gone.  Compared to the hundreds, if not thousands, of YouTube pages linked to Facebook pages, this is a small sample size, but relating to the one event that took place on August 21st, this represents a extremely significant amount of information.

The question for Facebook is how they see their role in the world.  Social media is being used as a place for both sides in the Syrian conflict to get their message out, and sometimes that includes unique and important information.  This has lead to an online information war, with both sides attempting to eliminate each other from the internet, with data on war crimes and key events in the conflict being the collateral damage, if not the intended target.  Facebook has a choice, develop it's policies to take into account the changing way in which online communities and social media are being used in relation to conflicts, or to be just another place where people can share pictures of their latest meal and funny cat pictures.

You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com.

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CBRN Threat Assessment For Sochi Winter Olympics

February 7, 2014, 5:01 am
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SecureBio's assessment on the CBRN threat to the Sochi Winter Olympics.

Executive Summary: SecureBio assess the CBRN threat for the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, 07 - 23 Feb 14, as SUBSTANTIAL (Attack is a strong possibility) with the prominent threats originating from hate groups, lone wolf actors and domestic terrorist groups, predominantly originating from the North-Caucasus. The CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear) threat is considered significant enough to recommend the implementation of specific CBRN defensive measures, including basic CBRN awareness training and the development and introduction of Immediate Action (IA) Procedures. However, the threat is not perceived to be significant enough to warrant the carrying of protective equipment.

SecureBio recommend that all personnel attending the Games have an awareness and understanding of CBRN material, the threat and the development of robust CBRN contingency plans. It is SecureBio’s assessment that a Radioactive Dispersal Device (RDD), small-scale chemical agent release or an attack against an individual/team utilising a white powder or an acid is the most likely form of CBRN attack. It is recommended that accompanying security advisors ensure that they have developed a suitable immediate action, decontamination and recovery plan.

SecureBio remain available for further advice, comment and training.

OVERVIEW
Introduction. Despite being hosted by a relatively stable state with advanced counter-terrorism detection, protection and response capabilities, the Winter Olympic Games in Sochi affords regional and domestic terrorist groups with an ideal platform to deliver a high profile attack, often referred to as a Spectacular. Russian Security Services have identified and named 17 domestic terrorist organisations operating inside Russia; many of these terrorist groups have publically stated their desire to obtain CBRN. As the Games approach, a number of these terrorist groups have publically stated their desire to deliver a Spectacular, one of which (Ansar al-Sunna) said that, unless Russia removes all military and security personnel from the Caucasus region they will resort to the use of Chemical Weapons.

Furthermore, the nature and profile of the Games makes them at risk from high profile terrorist organisation, seeking to deliver a Spectacular on the international stage:
  1. Live television, providing guaranteed broadcast of the attack.
  2. High profile and international event, delivering “the message” to a sizable audience.
  3. Programmed event, providing predictability and repeat events.
  4. Crowded places, likely to generate a high number of casualties and increased fear.
In response to the growing threat, Russian Security Forces have established a 1,500 mile “Ring of Steel” in an attempt to thwart any would be attackers however, reporting has indicated that several threat groups are already inside the Ring of Steel. The Ring of Steel has done little to calm international fears, with a series of recent events highlighting potential security weaknesses:
  1. In December 2013, the Caucasus Emirate (Imarat Kavkaz) conducted two successful terrorist attacks in Stravpol and Volgograd.
  2. Jihadists, believed to be members of the Caucasus Emirate, have been sighted by security services in and around Sochi.
  3. A member of the “Black Widows” has been sighted in Sochi, security services have issued a photograph around the city.
  4. A Fatwa has been issued authorising the use of Suicide Attacks.
Regional. Historically Russia has had a poor track record in protecting and monitoring its CBRN material, including commercial products, weaponised stockpiles and high activity radiological sources used in the power sector, a complete list is at Annex A. These events, occurring over a number of years, are likely to have assisted and maybe even gifted Russian domestic terrorist groups the ability to develop Chemical, Biological or Radiological agents for use in improvised CBRN devices.

Of note, the head of the Russian Nuclear Agency publicly stated that a “Few Grams” of weapons grade nuclear material has gone missing “Here and there” over the years. And as recently as October 2013, a terrorist group were thwarted attempting to blow up a Chemical Weapons storage facility in Kirov; it is assessed as likely that main effort was proliferation of chemical weapons and not the destruction of the facility.

International. Russia has historically held a fractious relationship with its eastern neighbours, even generating close political alliance with failed or failing states. The most recent and prevalent of these is Syria, approximately 1,200km from Sochi. The on-going instability in this region, coupled with Russia’s public alignment to the Assad regime and the number of fractious groups operating inside Syria, the proliferation of Chemical Weapons from Syria must not be discounted and could pose a risk to the Games.

THREAT GROUPS

There are several organisations and individuals that pose a CBRN threat within Russia, these groups could be defined as recognised terrorist organisations, hate groups, professional assassinations and lone wolfs.

Terrorist Organisation. There are 17 recognised terrorist groups operating within Russia’s borders, many with close affiliation to Al Qaeda (AQ) and other Islamic extremist organisations. A number of these groups have declared their intent to acquire CBRN material, in order to further their cause. Historically, these organisations have only initiated attacks in retaliation for Russian activity in North Caucasus or to achieve a specific political goal eg. The removal of all Russian claim to the Caucasus region.

SecureBio assess the threat of a CBRN attack during the Winter Olympics in Sochi, by one of the 17 recognised terrorist groups to be SUBSTANTIAL. The threat from terrorist organisations is the most volatile; it is therefore recommended that particular attention be paid to open source reporting and news coverage in the build up to the Games.

Hate Groups. There are a number of “home-grown” highly radical hate groups who frequently use violence or the threat of violence to achieve their aim. Many of the hate groups are xenophobic, with particular motivation coming from racial differences; in 2006 Amnesty International published a report stating that violent racism was out of control:

Due to the Games being on a World Scale, SecureBio assess the threat of a CBRN attack from a hate group to be MODERATE. Hate crimes are estimated to have reduced year on year since the peak in 2008 but remain significantly higher than the UK or Western-Europe.

Lone Wolfs. The lone wolf threat (eg. Bolshoi acid attack) is the hardest to understand, predict and mitigate, however recently there has been a great deal of media exposure to Russia’s stance on homosexuality and its environmental policy and an opportune lone wolf may see the Games as a means to highlight these therefore:

SecureBio assess the lone wolf CBRN threat to be SUBSTANTIAL. The Olympic Games are very high profile and could provide an opportunity for this type of attack.

THE AGENTS
There are a number of CBRN agents widely available in Russia and of possible interest to terrorist organisations, hate groups and lone wolfs.

Chemical. Chemicals agents are often chosen as they are readily available and can have an immediately life changing effect on the target. Despite their availability most harmful chemicals are relatively easy to detect, difficult to transport and will effect a number of individuals in the area not just the intended target. It is assessed that a small scale chemical attack from a Toxic Industrial Chemical or from a Chemical Warfare Agent proliferated from a Chemical Weapons Storage facility in Russia or Syria.
Acids. Acids are readily available as kitchen cleaners or drain un-blockers, are easy to transport and relatively innocuous. However, to be effective individuals would need to be close to the target (whilst maintaining some stand-off) and have sufficient time to prep the bottle/container. Most acids can be rapidly neutralised with FAST ACT or have their effects mitigated by the rapid application of copious quantities of water and the removal of outer clothing.
Hydrogen Cyanide. Hydrogen Cyanide (HCN), a chemical warfare agent, is one of the easiest to manufacturer from mixing Potassium Cyanide (used in the jewellery industry) and an acid. HCN is highly toxic but disperses rapidly in the wind, it would therefore need to be released in a controlled environment.
Biological. Despite a sizeable Soviet biological programme there have been comparatively few biological attacks in Russia. Furthermore, most biological agents require an incubation period, pose a significant threat to the individual transporting the agent and can be relatively easily neutralised; which makes them unpopular as a terrorist threat agent. It is assessed as unlikely that a biological agent would be used during the Games however the risk from a Hoax White Powder exists.

SecureBio assess the Bio threat to be LOW but the threat from a hoax White Powder to be SUBSTANTIAL. Our Biological Immediate Action Service (BIAS) is a highly effective mitigation service for this type of threat and has been developed to be used by non-specialist users.

Radiological & Nuclear. Owing to the geographical size of the Russian Federation and the remote locations, compact nuclear power generators were readily installed across the country. These, poorly protected, generators contain a differing radiological sources but most commonly is Strontium 90, a strong Beta emitter. Radiological sources are therefore readily available across Russia but easy to detect. The most likely delivery methods are:
Gamma Shine. These are typically left in a public location, with the intent of irradiating nearby individuals. Gamma Shine devices are relatively easy to detect and require a prolonged period of exposure to be truly effective. Despite this, there are several historic examples of this type of device being used in Russia.
Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD). RDDs are IEDs designed to scatter radioactive material over a wide area, they are not a nuclear device. As a weapon the fear generated by an RDD (or potential RDD) is more significant than its actual effectiveness as a lethal weapon.
Contaminated Food Stuffs. Ingested radioactive material is the most harmful and hardest to detect, the most recent example of this is Alexander Litvinenko.
SecureBio assess the threat to be SUBSTANTIAL from a Radiation Dispersal Device or Contaminated Food Stuffs.

RECOMMENDATION AND CONCLUSION

It is recommended that all staff working at the Olympic Games are made aware of the threat posed by CBRN material and have an appropriate contingency plan in place; the plan should focus on rapid decontamination action in the event of an acid attack but also include multiple evacuation routes, dependent on wind direction should other threat agents be used.

Currently, the threat is not perceived to be significant enough to warrant the carrying of protective equipment or the implementation of more aggressive and restrictive measures however management should be aware of the Action Plan.

"Today we were unlucky, but remember we only have to be lucky once - you will have to be lucky always." IRA, 1984.

SecureBio remain available for further advice, comment and training.
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Special Report On Hezbollah's Role In The Yabrud Offensive

February 12, 2014, 1:19 pm
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A special  report  by Elijah J Magnier on the Yabrud Offensive, originally published in Arabic here:

High ranking military sources in the Hezbollah and Assad military operations room:
- Advance against Yabrud will be on 6 axes around the city;
- Burkan (Volcano), artillery, tanks, air raids and Special Forces all deployed in the battle of Qalamoun
- Yabrud battle is supposed to end in less than a month at most
- The timing of the start of the attack coincided with the anniversary of the assassination of Imad Mughniyeh

Volcano rockets with Syrian forces in Yabrod [Source]
Hezbollah, supported by Syrian tanks, artillery and air raids, has started this morning a large scale battle advancing toward the city of Yabrud in the Qalamoun, close to the Lebanese-Syrian border.
In fact, the pro-Iranian Hezbollah initiated weeks ago their military operation when thousands of Special Forces were pushed in the area with the following objectives:
  1. Cut the supply line between Lebanon (Arsal) and Syria where rebels have safe heaven.
  2. Protect Damascus and its rif. 
  3. Divide, through future military operations, the North from the South of Syria.
Hezbollah used in this attack self-made Volcano (Burkan) rockets to advance on the ground from Nabak and Deir Atiya re-taking Al-Jarajeer and all the surrounding hills between Lebanon and Syria.  As this article is published, the battle is ongoing in Mazare Rim. The next stop is Fallita before heading toward Yabrud. Hezbollah has learned its lesson in Qusayr: “No more safe exits for rebels” since more than a thousand of them escaped towards Qalamoun. Today, Hezbollah has to fight against those same rebels once more.

A senior leader in the joint operations room, run by Hezbollah and the Syrian regime, said that "the Special Forces started their ground attack on all axes at the crack of dawn. Hezbollah intelligence unit, through meticulous under-cover operation, has gathered detailed information on the number of rebels, where their command centers are, and what is their capability and readiness to fight."

The source said: "After gathering all necessary information, we launched the attack, which coincided with the anniversary of the martyrdom of Hajj Imad Mughnniyeh, Sayyed Abbas Musawi, Sheikh Ragheb Harb and all those who fell by the extremist's car bombs sent to Lebanon. Our message to these: Nahnu Qadimun (We are coming)".

"The battle of Qalamoun will be run differently from the one of Qusayr: Far more intensive fire power to reduce loses and inflict more damage to the rebels. We shall block entry to the city and villages from all access and directions. The advance of the Special Forces (SF) will progress from six different axes to separate the rebel lines and isolate them into smaller groups." explained the source.

He pointed out "Hezbollah SF who have participated in the battle of East Ghota, Idlib and Qusayr have been deployed in the battle with their experience and full equipment, including their special Burkan (Volcano) to open the road."

The source said that, according to their intelligence information, there are "some 200 Lebanese fighters under the banner of the extremist groups, while the rest is divided as follows: One third Saudi, one third from different Gulf countries including Palestinians and one third Syrian, mainly under Jabhat al-Nusra’s command".

According to this high ranking military commander, it is "difficult to predict how long the battle will last, none the less, Yabrud will surely take less time than Qusayr which is no more than two to three weeks".

In relation to the 12 nuns kidnapped by the extremists, the source was aware of the kidnappers request and revealed "the extremists asked to stop the battle against Yabrud and to release 500 extremists from the Rumiyeh jail and from Syria. This is unacceptable since each one of these will return to fight again. We hold the extremists responsible for the safety of the nuns".
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Evidence Of The Syrian Military Deploying BM-30 Smerch Launched Cluster Munitions

February 14, 2014, 2:19 am
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On February 12th 2014, the following video from Kafr Zita, Hama, was uploaded to YouTube, showing what was claimed to be the remains of a cluster munition


The munition has broken into two sections, the first section is shown below, in an image stitched together from two video stills


The nose cone section is shown below


The remains of the rocket were much larger than any air-dropped cluster munitions used by the Syrian air force, so I took at a look at the multiple rocket launchers used by the Syrian military.  The BM-27 Uragan is the largest multiple rocket launcher system I could find that open source information suggested was being used by the Syrian military, but the 220mm calibre of the rockets seemed far too small for what was seen in the above images.  I compared the foot in the top left corner of the above image to the width of the rocket, and from that it was clear the rocket was closer to 27-30cm wide than the BM-27's 22cm calibre.

I reviewed large rocket systems, and from my investigations it appears the best match is the BM-30 Smerch, a Soviet multiple rocket launcher system, which entered service in the Soviet Army in 1989.  It launches several types of rockets, including cluster munitions designated 9M55K, 9M55K1, and 9M55K4.  While there's not a great amount of detail on the rockets online, I did come across the following image (source)


This shows the 9M55K rocket on the top, and the 9M55F (high explosive fragmentation) rocket on the bottom.  They share a number of design features, some of which I've highlighted below





Based on this, and other images, it seems certain the remains of the rocket in the video is from the 9M55K range of cluster munition rockets, launched by the BM-30 Smerch.  While there's no open source information that suggests the Syrian military has this system, it seems unlikely that the rocket could have come from any other source.  With a range of 90km, it not possible to know what the point of origin was, but it does appear to be the first evidence that the Syrian military are using BM-30 Smerch multiple rocket launchers in the conflict.

Thank to Chris Kabusk for help with this article.

Also thanks to Bente Aika Scheller, author of The Wisdom of Syria's Waiting Game. Foreign Policy under the Assads, whose donation to last years Indiegogo campaign helped keep this blog going.

You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com.
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Special Report On The Yabrud Offensive From Elijah J Magnier

February 15, 2014, 1:50 pm
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A special report by Elijah J Magnier on the ongoing Yabrud Offensive.  His earlier report on the opening stages of the Offensive can be found here.

  • Al-Qalamoun, the Syrian Tora-Bora
  • Al Jarajeer and Al Sahel in the hands of attacking forces
  • 207 rebels were killed in the first week by over 45 air raids, Kornet missiles, tanks and artillery.
  • A full description of the battle map

It is not the battle of Yabroud but the battle of Al-Qalamoun.  Regular Syrian Army Forces, along side with Hezbollah Special Forces, initiated this week a ground attack against Al Qalamoun occupying strategic position and attacking cities around Yabrud. None of the forces engaged consider it is going to be an easy walk. The attacking forces describe the topography of al-Qalamoun, with its mountains and hills, as the ‘Syrian Tora-Bora’, referring to the infamous Afghan mountains.

Over 45 air raids were carried against the rebel’s position in the area so far. More than 207 rebel fighters were killed. All three arms (ground, air, artillery) are fully engaged on the front line.
Hezbollah claim that all car bombs are prepared in Yabroud, driven to Arsal and into its stronghold in the Bekaa and the suburb of Beirut.

A few days prior the beginning of the attack, Shaikh Naim Qassem, vice Secretary general of Hezbollah, explained that ‘it was necessary to put an end to the car bombs coming from Yabrud’. Sayed Hasan Nusrallah, Hezbollah Leader, will be tomorrow evening on Al Manar TV to talk about the newly formed government; the Takfirees operation in Lebanon following the arrest of Naim Abbas, a commander of the Al-Qaeda affiliated Abdullah Azzam terrorist group; to prepare the Shia community for the lost of lives Hezbollah will suffer in Al-Qalamoun battle as he did prior the battle of Quseyr and during Hezbollah full engagement in Syria since May 2013.

A high-ranking source in the joint military operational room said “Al Jarajeer and Al-sahel are fully under the control of the attacking forces, advancing at the moment toward other objectives close to Yabrud and engaged on different fronts. So far, we have counted 207 rebels killed even if the close contacts has been limited so far, allowing the fire power to pound all rebels positions in the area”. The source explained the course of the battle as following:

East: Syrian troops and artillery are deployed East of Yabrud on all strategic positions and hills overlooking Yabroud, from Al Nabak to al-Qastal where Rima farms, Yabrud and Ras al A’yn are under artillery fire control. This is essential to avoid any tactical withdrawal of the rebels toward rif-Dimashq.

North: The front attack has started from the North of Yabrud where the main attacking forces moved from Nabak toward Rima Farms. Strong firepower was used to bombard rebel’s position. The advance forces are also supported by the artillery positioned East of Rima Farms contributing in pounding the farms. Until today, half of Rima farms have been re-taken. No civilians inside Rima farms. Thousands left the area toward the Syrian position prior the battle. These are neutral families. Others, the families of the rebels, were divided between those who left to Arsal (Lebanon) and others toward Yabrud.

West: The main battle is in the West to support the Northern-front attack toward Yabrud. This is where the main military operation is engaged. On the West side, troops were deployed on the mountains and roads between Lebanon and Syria. Four of the six official roads are today fully under control. The remaining two roads are today under fire control and will be soon closed. No vehicle can cross between the two borders. There are ten unofficial roads between Lebanon and Syria, leading to the Lebanese city of Arsal. All these roads are today fully under control. The attacking forces are using smugglers of the area to identify all possible existing paths and caves. On the other hand, ground troops managed to enter both Al-Jarajeer and Al-Sahel. The battle is ongoing now in the surrounded city of Falita, under heavy bombardment.

Nonetheless, notorious inhabitants of Falita asked to negotiate an exit for rebels. The city of Falita is completely surrounded. Inhabitants were asked to gather all weapons in one accessible place for the attacking forces and to raise the Syrian flag is they agreed to surrender. The attacking forces will not enter the city unless the road is completely cleared. We have spotted 6 vehicles with armed rebels going from Falitah toward Yabrud. Anti-tank 9M133 Kornet missiles destroyed these. Hezbollah has effectively used the laser guided missiles Kornet in 2006 war causing heavy loss among the best Israeli tanks, the Merkava.
Always on the West, the attacking forces are advancing on the easier landscape between Falita and Rima Farms, closing the wing on both Rima farms and Yabrud. There is no close contact with the rebels in this area, allowing the artillery to open the road ahead of the ground forces.

South West: On the South West of Yabroud, there is the city of Ras Ma’ara. Forces are advancing North toward Ras Ma’ara to close the road to Yabrud. West of ras Ma’ara there are the Lebanese Shia area of Nahle, Baalbeck, Nabi-Sheet and others, preventing any infiltration into Lebanon.

According to the source, “the city of Yabrud has not been completely surrounded. A passage south of Yabrud maybe left open for a possible withdrawal.”

When asked about the same experience Hezbollah faced in Quseyr allowing some of the rebels to withdraw to fight these later in other places, the source explained: “We're constantly revising our plans according to the battle field necessities. If all the rebels decide to stay, we shall face these. This is what we came to al-Qalamoun for. The style of attack has changed. First we use air force, artillery and tanks power. Ground troops come last. Rebels will be completely trapped inside if we decide to close the passage later. Ground troops will enter when little resistance remains. If the rebels decide to leave, we occupy more land (Yabroud/Qalamoun) with less loss and we shall face these some other time in the battle field if they still have the will to continue fighting”.
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More Evidence Of BM-30 Smerch Launched Rockets In Syria

February 17, 2014, 9:23 am
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Since my post earlier this week on 9M55 series rockets, as launched by the BM-30 Smerch, appearing in Syria, more evidence of the use of these rockets has appeared.  First, this video showing cluster munitions from the town of Kafr Zita, Hama


As the Armament Research Services website details, these are unexploded 9N235 fragmentation submunitions, deployed by 9M55K rockets, fired from the BM-30 Smerch and 220 mm 9M27K1 rockets for the BM-27 Uragan MLRS.  Considering the remains of a nearby 9M55 series rocket, it seems very likely those rocket remains would be the 9M55K.

In addition to the remains of the rocket uploaded on February 12th, two photographs were posted online today that appear to show the remains of a large rocket motor

[Source]
[Source]
The source of the first picture claims this is a Fajr-5 rocket, but it shares many similarities with images of 9M55K rockets, and the second picture was reportedly taken in the town of al-Tah, 20km north of Kafr Zita, where the earlier example of a 9M55K rocket was found.  Chris Kabusk put together the following composite image to demonstrate what the separate parts would look like compared to a complete 9M55K rocket


Thanks to Mads Dahl for highlighting the two images in this post.

You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com.


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Update On The Yabrud Offensive From Elijah J Magnier

February 23, 2014, 1:26 pm
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A special report by Elijah J Magnier on the ongoing Yabrud Offensive.  His earlier reports on the opening stages of the Offensive can be found here and here.

Battle of Qalamoun: First revelation on Qusseyr battle
  • 9 killed and 21 wounded among Hezbollah fighters in the first 10 days in Qalamoun when over 250 were registered between dead and wounded in the first 10 days of Qussyr
  • Hezbollah/SAA forces moved 1500 meters inside Rima Farms
  • Over 15000 Hezbollah fighters involved in Qalamoun along with SAA
  • Nusrallah ordered to slow down the advance to avoid losses
High-ranking officer within the joint military operational room run by Hezbollah and SAA in Syria claimed, Most cities in Qalamoun are today under fire control. In one or two cities, inhabitants and FSA have decided to stop rebels from accessing to avoid the battle. Other cities refused to continue negotiating, intimidated by rebels. At the moment, the main ‘arrow advance’ of attacking forces is taking place in Rima Farms were forces advanced 1500 meters inside the farms. The objective is to reach Yabrud from North. Nine Hezbollah fighters have been killed and 21 wounded in the first 10 days of the battle’. According to the source, ‘Hezbollah Leader Sayed Hasan Nusrallah instructed his men to move slowly, ignoring time factor, to reduce losses. We are fully aware that, once the battle rhythm increases, the number of live losses will increase as well.

In the first revelation ever made about the battle of Qusseyr, the source confirmed, “In the first 10 days of Qusseyr battle, over 250 Hezbollah fighters were killed and wounded. Therefore, the military tactic has changed. We are surrounding each city to isolate it from others. As far as it concerns (rebels) mountain position and stronghold, as soon as the city of Yabrud falls, the rebels logistic support for those taking refuge in mountains and caves will be cut off and terminated, making their resistance more difficult on the long term”.

He added, “In several locations in Qalamoun, close combat have taken place. The rebels managed to destroy many (SAA) vehicles and tanks. That is a normal outcome because we, the attacking forces, are manoeuvring, spreading forces and advancing in a large geographic area. While the rebels have taken refuge in different static locations. As in every battle, there are losses taken into account, particularly in Qalamoun where a very high number of rebels is gathering, unwilling to surrender.”

The source concluded: ”Hezbollah has injected in Qalamoun battle over 15000 fighters in a vast area, manoeuvring and holding the initiative of attack and deciding upon the location of close contact. That is offering a unique experience in fighting al-Qaeda and other enemies should these arises.” 
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Significant New Barrel Bomb And Volcano Rocket Images

March 3, 2014, 5:18 am
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A couple of interesting videos have appeared online in the last few days that provide new information on both Volcano rockets and DIY barrel bombs.  The first video was posted on February 28th, and shows a unique DIY barrel bomb drop


This video shows what appears to be the same design of DIY barrel bomb used widely across the country over the last few months, mounted on the stub wings of a Hind helicopter.  All previous examples of DIY barrel bomb drops have shown the bombs pushed out the rear of Hip transport helicopters, so to see them dropped from stub wings is a major change in how they are deployed.  It also begs the question, why is a helicopter that can carry large, powerful bombs, being used to drop DIY bombs?  When transport helicopters were being used, it seemed reasonable to assume they were dropping DIY barrel bombs to make the most of the Syrian air forces transport fleet.  Could this be an indication that bomb supplies are now running low at certain air bases?

The second video shows the launch of a Volcano rocket as part of the Yabroud Offensive


This appears to be the largest type of Volcano rocket, a type previously seen in this video from the Syrian National Defence Force, as opposed to the type based off 122mm rockets used in the August 21st attack.  What's interesting about this video is it includes the launch, flight, and impact, as well as the sound of the impact.  From the delay between seeing the impact and hearing the sound of the impact (around 8 seconds), it's possible to calculate that based on the speed of sound the distance travelled by the rocket is at least 2700m.  Due to the shaky camera movement and poor quality image, it's possible the impact occurs earlier than we can see in the video, so it's possible the range may be more than 2700m.  It's worth noting a Shia Facebook page claimed these rockets had a range of 1-3km, so this is the first evidence that the claim might be correct.

There's also this image of a Volcano rocket, taken by government forces outside the town of Zara, where they've been fighting to capture the town for the past few months


What's interesting about this picture is the tail fins of the Volcano rocket.  It appears they are swept back, and no tail ring is visible, unlike all other examples of larger Volcano rockets seen in the conflict so far.  This may be the first example of a new design of Volcano rocket being deployed by government forces.  As yet, no other information is known about this design.
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New Online Tool For Archiving Facebook Pages

March 5, 2014, 12:26 am
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Last month, I wrote about how Facebook was deleting large numbers of Facebook pages relating to the conflict in Syria, in many cases as a result of targeted campaigns by pro-government groups against specific pages.  As a result, large amounts of information about the conflict was being lost, and my own survey discovered that included the majority of pages posting initial reports on the August 21st Sarin attack in Damascus.

As a response to this, a new site has been launched that hopes to preserve this information by archiving Facebook pages.  Alghayma, meaning “The Cloud” in Arabic, is the creation Frederic Jacobs and Batikh Souri, and their hope is to not only archive Facebook pages, but also turn them into more usable information.  That includes developing improved search functions, a torrent of the entire archive, and many other functions as the project progresses.

Users can support the project by authorising the Facebook app, that allows more requests from Alghayma to the Facebook servers, allowing pages to be archived more frequently, and anyone can add pages or search for pages already archived here.


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The Martyrs of Mheen Brigade Arrives In Qalamoun With A Large Supply Of Chinese Anti-Tank Weapons

March 7, 2014, 1:11 am
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The following video was uploaded to Youtube on March 6th by the Martyrs of Mheen Brigade


The video shows the Martyrs of Mheen Brigade unloading 13 covered tubes.  The markings on the boxes they are uploading from have been purposely and systematically obscured



The items are described at "Red Arrows" in the video, the name used for Chinese HJ-8 ATGMs (Anti-Tank Guide Missiles) , and it's possible to determine the exact model thanks to the coverings on the rockets


As per Ares Arms Research Services' earlier post on Chinese ATGMs in Syria, the letter "E" in a circle indicates these are HJ-8E models, the same type reportedly supplied by Qatar earlier in the conflict, which also had their markings obscured.

The earliest posts on the Martyrs of Mheen Facebook page suggests they have been active in the Qalamoun region since October 2013, and videos posted to another YouTube channel associated with the group show they have access to Croatian RAK-12 multiple rocket launchers, supplied to opposition groups aligned to the Free Syrian Army in early 2013 by Saudi Arabia, smuggled via Jordan into the south of Syria.

It's very interesting that the same group have access to the Croatian weapons provided by Saudi Arabia and these Chinese HJ-8E ATGMs, fresh supplies of which have been rumoured to have entered the south of the country in recent weeks.  Could the HJ-8Es in this new video be the first signs of large quantities of this new supply arriving in Syria?
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ISIS Deploys Croatian Weapons Against The Iraqi Army

March 8, 2014, 3:20 pm
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In early 2013, Saudi Arabia began smuggling weapons it had purchased from the Croatian government through Jordan to the south of Syria, to forces loyal to the Free Syrian Army.  At the time, videos posted by the Syrian opposition showed a number of weapons coming into the south of Syria, including RBG-6 grenade launchers, M60 recoilless guns, RPG-22 rocket launchers, and M79 Osa rocket launchers.  In March 2013, videos began to appear showing these weapons appearing with groups outside of the FSA, including Jihadists such as Ahrar al-Sham, and images posted today show these weapons have now spread even further afield.

A series of images were posted on Twitter by the account Alanbar_news, an account used by the al-Qaeda linked Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham, with the @Alanbar_news account covering their operations in Al Anbar Governorate of Iraq.  The images show their operations against US-made armoured vehicles belonging to the Iraqi army (collected here), and one image in particular stood out


This photograph appears to show a M79 Osa, as supplied to the Free Syrian Army at the start of 2013, being used to attack Iraqi armoured vehicles inside Iraq.  The following image compares the M79 Osa to what's visible in the above photograph


Another recent photograph from ISIS shows a fighter with what appears to be a Croatian RBG-6 grenade launcher


These weapons are not used in the region (apart from those supplied to the Free Syrian Army), so it seems extremely likely these weapons are the same ones purchased from Croatia, by Saudi Arabia, and smuggled through Jordan.  Now, despite the best intentions of those who were involved with providing these weapons to the Free Syrian Army, these weapons are being used to attack Iraqi government forces inside Iraq, a clear indication that attempts to control the spread of weapons beyond the borders of Syria and the groups that initially received them has failed in a spectacular fashion.  This raises serious questions when there's talk of providing the opposition in Syria with Chinese FN-6 MANPADS (surface-to-air missiles), especially when these Croatian weapons have ended up in the hands of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham.

Thanks to @ShamiWitness for highlighting these photographs, and Aymenn Jawad al-Tamimi for additional information.
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Has The Release Of 13 Orthodox Nuns Created A Real Turn In The Battle Of Yabrud?

March 11, 2014, 10:45 am
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-       Zilzal, along with Burkan, introduced against Yabrud this week

-       Details of nun’s deal

 Special report by Elijah J Magnier–

Thirteen Greek Orthodox nuns and their three maids were held for over 3 months against their will by Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN), a Jihadi rebel group presumably affiliated to al-Qaeda operating in Lebanon and Syria. These were freed over the weekend after being abducted from their convent in Maaloula, north of Damascus and one of the rare locations in the World where the ancient language of Jesus Christ is still spoken. Their release marks a real turn in the battle of Al-Qalamoun.

A high ranking officer in the Syrian Army / Hezbollah joint military operation room who seeks anonymity said that ‘the order of the day in al Qalamoun battle is to concentrate all military operation on Yabrud, the city itself, rather than other cities. This move was due to:

1.     Intelligence information

2.     Request of JAN to allow a free passage for fighters as part of nun release deal

The source said: “Our intelligence information refers that, in the last week, several thousands of fighters left Yabrud for southern cities. This information corroborates JAN’s hostage release deal, it requested a free corridor for 1500 fighters to leave Yabrud toward Assal al-Ward and Rankus. We have rejected this request and offered the fighters to give up on their weapons, leave the city and surrender. JAN refused to lay down the arms. Instructions were given to shell Yabrud with modified Burkan and Zilzal. Moreover, Yabrud will be under intensified air raid this week like never before. The ground troops will be ready to break in and re-take the city once the shelling will stop. We are at the door of the city now.”

Burkan (Volcano), a short-range rocket and Zilzal (Earthquake), a long-range missile. The modification introduced by both Hezbollah and the Syria army turned the short-range rocket to a limited range of 300 m, and the long-range missiles to a shorter range but with a modified warhead that can carry explosives from 250kg to 900 kg.

Rebel sources deny the advance of Hezbollah/SAA forces into Rima farms, insisting the battle still ongoing inside the city and has not reach Yabrud yet.

No proof or footage could confirm either claim so far.

According to the source “There are many rebel factions inside Yabrud, mainly guided by Jahbat al-Nusra. JAN is led by Abu Malik al-Talli and his vice Abu Azzam al-Kuwaiti, both are directing the battle in Yabrud. They have offered to leave with their fighters. As far as we are concerned, the number of fighters inside Yabrud is irrelevant. We will deal with them”.

Regarding the nuns and their maids, the source said that “Qatar paid one million dollar for each hostage, with a total of 16 millions delivered by the Qatari envoy. Moreover, the regime agreed to free 155 prisoners out of 950 negotiated as part of the nun’s release”.

Rebel sources denied receiving any ransom.

Sources close to the Lebanese head of the ‘Sureté Generale’ Brigadier General Abbas Ibrahim, present at the negotiation, confirmed that “money was part of the deal”, without disclosing further information.

When asked about Hezbollah losses in the al-Qalamoun battle; the source indicated “Hezbollah has lost 45 so far with 4 reported missing during a reconnaissance mission and around 80 wounded. Hezbollah can accept up to a thousand if necessary to end the entire battle of Qalamoun and secure completely the absence of rebels along the borders with Lebanon and close to Damascus. Yabrud is only the beginning. There are other battles awaiting in al-Qalamoun further south”.

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Elijah J Magnier On The Latest Developments In The Yabrud Offensive

March 16, 2014, 11:58 am
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Is Qalamoun battle over? Hezbollah will be standing on over 18000 sqm2.

Special report from Elijah J. Magnier – @EjmAlrai

The battle of Yabrud is over but not the battle of Qalamoun. As written in previous reports (see here), it took the attacking forces over a month to end the battle of Yabrud. Moreover, the nuns‘ exchange marked a turn in the battle when Jabhat al-Nusra  (JAN) asked a free passage to 1500 fighters. The request was refused but corroborated intelligence information to attacking forces regarding the number of rebels left in the city. Today, JAN accuses other rebel groups for the fall of Yabrud, claiming these did not fight. Similar claim by rebels was also formulated when the fate of Qusseyr battle was marked. JAN was the leading force – but not the only one – in Yabrud. Obviously, the rebels do not fight under one command, neither as one man like the attacking forces.

The city of Yabrud was under heavy shelling by air, artillery and ground troops who used all sorts of weapons (see previous report).

According to a reliable source within the attacking forces, “the Syrian Army offered logistic and fire support to Hezbollah fighters who launched a frontal simulated attack from Rima Farms and the west of Yabrud as a diversion. The real penetration of ground troops took place from the East, breaking the rebels defensive lines. By night fall, another penetration of forces advanced from West into the national hospital to meet the forces from the East in the city Centre were heavy fighting took place. Once the defensive line was broken, the rebels lost their will to continue fighting”.

“The attacking forces decided to launch repetitive attacks at night to limit the damage and casualties but also due to rebels’ lack of night vision equipment and rebels anti-tank missile (Kornet and others). Rebels relied on caves, hills and on the difficult topography of the area to slow down the attacking forces. The rebels were prepared for the battle since 4 months bringing in men and military supplies. Re-taking the hills first took most of the month and was not an easy task but a necessary move and an essential military tactic to ensure the protection of the attacking ground troops on the city. Hezbollah has lost most of his casualties in the mountains battle”, said the source.

The source explained “most of what was left from the remaining of the rebels fled Yabrud by night, leaving behind military hardware, as well as hundreds of bodies from different nationalities. These are Saudi, Kuwaiti, Tunisian, Egyptian, Moroccan, Iraqi, Lebanese and others. A small number of rebels have surrender”.

But this is not the end of the Qalamoun battle. Falita (West of Yabrud), Ras al-Ain (South of Yabrud) and Ras al-Maarra (South-West of Yabrud) all are on the main list of the next attack from the Qalamoun area. Rankus, around 80 km from Yabrud, maybe better attacked from Lebanon rather than Al-Qalamoun for its vicinity to the Lebanese-Syrian borders.

Many unconfirmed claims from cities in Qalamoun claiming a will to negotiate with the regime forces to spear the numerous cities south of Yabrud, including Maalula. It is clear that Hezbollah will not stop to celebrate its victory over Yabrud and will not take a break. The military operation will continue, taking advantage of the low moral of the rebels and their scattered men.

Moreover, the Qalamoun Mountains represent undoubtedly a future “military zone” for Hezbollah for its war against Israel. It is clear that Hezbollah, today, is no longer standing on 10452 sqm2 (the surface of Lebanon) but will be on additional 8000 sqm2, starting from Tal Kalakh, north of Quseyr to Zabadani, once the battle of Qalamoun is over.
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Evidence Of New Models Of Volcano Rockets

April 2, 2014, 1:03 pm
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Several weeks ago, I posted an image taken by Syrian forces near the opposition controlled town of Zara showing a twin barrel Volcano rocket launcher


What was interesting about this image is it appeared the Volcano rocket loaded into the launcher had a slightly different design from Volcano rockets seen in the past year.  The tail fins appear to be swept back, and absent the usual tail ring, but due to the quality of the image it was not possible to be 100% certain.

Now, a new video from the town of Maliha shows the remains of what appears to be the same type of rocket


There appears to be three similarities between the tails fins show in the above video, and the tail fins from Volcano rockets used in other attacks



1 - The tail fins are welded into slots.
2 - The tail fins extend beyond the end of the rocket.
3 - A small screw hole is visible near the base of the rocket at the same position on both rockets.

Having studied a large number of images of rocket and missile tail fins in my months of research of Volcano rockets, in my opinion it seems fairly certain that this new video shows the first close up of the new type of Volcano rocket, confirming that the earlier picture did show the new design being deployed.

You can contact the author on Twitter @brown_moses or by email at brownmoses@gmail.com
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Why Nigel Farage Has It All Wrong: Smoking Guns, Hexamine, And Syrian Sarin

April 2, 2014, 2:56 pm
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A guest post by chemical weapons specialist Dan Kaszeta.

This evening witnessed the odd spectacle  of Mr. Nigel Farage, MEP and head of the rightwing UK Independence Party, giving ventilation to discredited theories.  This is not the first time strange utterances have come from Mr. Farage, but this time he has parked himself squarely in the lane of my expertise. Sadly, he’s placed himself on the side of the brutal Assad dictatorship by repeating conspiracy theories that somehow Syrian rebels perpetrated the 21 August 2013 attacks on themselves.  This canard has been proved to be substantially wrong.   Others address it by means of  analysis  of the rockets used, but I rely on the technical aspects of the chemical weapon that was used.  I am using this particular opportunity to summarize the work myself and many others have done over the last months to get to the bottom of the 8/21 attacks.

The UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights issued a UN report  that confirms what I have known to be the case for some time.  There is evidence tying the Sarin chemical warfare agent used at Ghouta last year to the significant chemical warfare stockpile of the Syrian government.   I originally formulated my ideas in November of last year, and provisionally called them the ‘Hexamine Hypothesis’, a theory which now appears to be vindicated.  Indeed, I believe that the chemical hexamine is a unique link tying the Ghouta war crimes to the Syrian government.  This article explains the what, why, and how of the ‘Hexamine Hypothesis’.

Two general categories of Sarin

To the layman, Sarin is Sarin. But that’s simply not true.  I have spent a lot of time and effort studying the history of Sarin and the particularly obtuse history of industrial efforts to produce Sarin.  There are at least 20 production pathways to Sarin, each of at least 5 steps.   I do not exclude the theoretical possibility of additional pathways to Sarin being developed in a laboratory at some point in the future.  All of these methods rely on one of two reactions to produce Sarin in the final chemical reaction. For the purposes of this discussion, we can divide Sarin into two basic categories, based on the final chemical reaction.  

DF + Isopropanol reaction - The simplest methods react DF and Isopropanol.  Often, online sources, some of which are of dubious provenance, refer exclusively to these methods.  Most of the 20 or so Sarin production pathways use this reaction. This reaction combines DF (methylphosphonyl difluoride) with isopropyl alcohol.  1 mol DF + 1 mol Isopropanol react to create 1 mol Sarin + 1 mol HF (hydrogen fluoride).  By mass, this works out to 140 g of HF for each 1 kg of Sarin produced.  As you probably can understand, this residual HF is highly dangerous and destructive.  It is corrosive to most materials and seriously reduces the shelf-life of the Sarin.  Indeed, this reaction is really only suitable for binary-type weapons, and even then only if you do something about the residual HF acid. (More on this later.) The Japanese Aum Shin Rikyo cult, which used Sarin in 1994-1995 in terrorist attacks in Japan used one of the methods using this step.  If you are making Sarin to keep for a long period of time, production processes that use this reaction are not very useful as it is indeed hard to get rid of this HF.   Saddam Hussein's Iraq discovered this, because they used these methods, and the shelf life of their Sarin could be measured in weeks.  The US military used this method in the M687 binary Sarin artillery shell, and found that, without some method to counteract the HF, the binary Sarin weapon systems barely survived the six to ten seconds time of flight of an artillery shell.
“High quality Sarin” – Some critics have made points about whether or not the 8/21 Sarin was “high quality” or not.  It should be noted that this DF + Isopropanol reaction cannot make “pure” or “high grade Sarin” by definition.  This process produces a cocktail of Sarin and HF.  It produces a mix that is, at best, 50% Sarin by mol or 87% if you go by weight.
The DC+DF reaction (The "di-di" process.) - The US and the Soviet Union both realized that DF+Isopropyl worked, but created Sarin that was not very useful for long-term storage.  Both the US and the Soviet Union wanted to have weapons that could be kept in long-term storage until they were needed, not artillery shells and rockets that had only a few months shelf-life.  In this method, equal parts of DC (methylphosphonic dichloride) and DF are reacted with alcohol to produce Sarin and HCl.  From an economic and industrial viewpoint, these DC+DF methods are more complicated, because they require effectively two parallel production paths, one for DF and one for DC.  The important difference is the residual contaminant in the Sarin. In the di-di process, the residual is hydrogen chloride (HCl) not HF. While being corrosive and dangerous, is not as difficult to deal with the HCl as is the HF in the other methods. More importantly, it is much more possible on an industrial scale to refine this residual HCl out of the Sarin and get a high purity product.  Getting rid of this excess HCl is still not easy and both the US and the Soviet Union had to do a lot of research and spend much time and money to figure out how to do it.  These issues were eventually solved, but the effort to do so was measured in years and millions of dollars. It was a complex industrial process and is still considered a secret.  Indeed, the US had to re-refine its earlier stockpiles of Sarin in order to ensure a long shelf-life for its Sarin. 

Environmental and biomedical samples after 8/21

The joint UN/OPCW mission collected a number of biomedical and environmental samples.  If we delve into the details of both the interim and the final reports as well as various reports and statement made by the OPCW, there are interesting conclusions we can make if we carefully examine the fine details. These are as follows:
  • Sarin was used, not some other chemical.  We know this for the following reasons:
  • Sarin was actually detected in field samples
  • Both unique and generic Sarin decomposition products were detected in field samples
  • Sarin was re-generated out of protein adducts in human blood using a sophisticated method known as fluoride regeneration. 
  • The Sarin was binary, produced from a DF + alcohol method.  We know this for several reasons:
  • The OPCW’s own documents  refer to the Syrian government having binary methods for production of chemical warfare agents. A chemical known as MPFA (methylphosphonofluoridic acid) was found in many of the environmental samples.  This is a hydrolysis product of DF. DF degrades quickly into MPFA in the environment.  This is no smoking gun on its own, as MPFA is also a decomposition product of Sarin under alkaline conditions.  
  • No DF was found. But I would not expect this, as DF is far more volatile than Sarin, and would have either evaporated or degraded. 
  • A DC+DF method requires DC. There is no evidence of DC production, DC precursors, or DC decomposition products.  
  • The chemical hexamine, also known as hexamethylenetetramine, was present in large numbers of the field samples. It would appear that the munitions contained hexamine for some reason.  The significance of this finding was unknown to me at the time.  But with only one exception (a headscarf), hexamine was in every sample that had Sarin or Sarin decomposition products.  There were also many samples that had hexamine, but no Sarin, but this is a logical state of affairs as hexamine does not evaporate like Sarin does. 

The Syrian Regime’s Declared Inventory of Chemicals

An interesting revelation occurred 20 November 2013.  The OPCW issued a document called a “Request for Expression of Interest ” for the disposal of chemicals from Syria.  This document described the OPCW’s requirements to safely get rid of various chemicals from the Syrian government’s chemical weapons program.  The serious high-grade chemicals, such as chemical warfare agents themselves and immediate precursors aren’t listed.  So this document represents an effort to get rid of the various feedstock, additive, and waste chemicals that represent less of a proliferation hazard.  For example, the list contains 30 tons of phosphorous trichloride, which is an early feedstock chemical in many of the production methods for making Sarin.  The list also included 80 tons of hexamine.  This is really interesting.  There’s hexamine all over the battlefield and hexamine in the storage vaults of the Syrian government. 

Knowing how the Chemical Weapons Convention is written and understanding how the OPCW works, one can make several assumptions from this revelation. 
  • Assad’s government admitted to having 80 tons of hexamine. This kind of list would only be made based on declarations by the Syrian government.  The OPCW inspectors did not have the resources or wherewithal to crawl into every nook and cranny of Syria during an active war.  If 80 tons of hexamine are on this list, it is likely because this list was given to the OPCW by the Syrian government
  • The hexamine is for chemical weapons purposes: The OPCW operates within the terms of its mandate. Hexamine isn’t a substance on the various schedules of the CWC.  The OPCW has no remit to deal hexamine for its numerous commercial and industrial uses, including the manufacture of RDX, an explosive.  If it is on this list, it is because either the OPCW believes it has a use in chemical weapons industrial processes, the Syrians said that it was for such processes, or both. 
  • 80 tons ain’t cheap to get rid of: The OPCW is not going to spend money getting rid of 80 tons of a chemical unrelated to either its remit or the problem at hand.  
  • Hexamine would have been easy to deny: If the Assad regime wanted to deny the 8/21 attacks, they would have had ample opportunity to do so by not declaring the hexamine.  As it is not a scheduled chemical under the CWC it would have been quite easy for Syria to not declare it. 
The Hexamine Hypothesis

So, what is the hexamine doing on the list? And why is it all over the battlefield.  There are many commercial and industrial uses of hexamine , as a cooking and heating fuel, as the most common example.  It also has uses as an anti-corrosion aide.  However, it has very little history of use in the history of chemical warfare. Indeed, I researched the subject at some length and the only use I could find was its sporadic use as an anticorrosion additive in the seriously outdated Levinstein Mustard, an older form of Sulfur Mustard (commonly misnamed “Mustard Gas”).  There’s no use for hexamine in Mustard production processes after the 1920s, and it does not occur as a trace content in published specifications for either older or more recent US Mustard, nor does it have any use as a precursor.  

Hexamine’s anti-corrosion properties stem partly or even largely from its ability to bind with acid molecules.  This is where it gets interesting.  The US Army spent a lot of time trying to turn binary Sarin, made by the DF + Isopropanol method into a useful weapon system.  This process, described in detail above, results not in pure Sarin but in a cocktail of Sarin and Hydrogen Fluoride (HF).  When the US tried to make weapons, like the M687 155mm howitzer round, using the binary method, this surplus HF was like a wrecking ball inside the munition.  Most of the information from the M687 program is still not available, but it takes little imagination or technical knowledge to realize that HF, one of the most corrosive chemicals in existence, will have a serious deleterious effect on things like the case of the shell, the fuze, and the conventional explosive bursting charge.   The US military found that the chemical isopropylamine (also noted in the Syrian inventory, by the way) was an isopropanolamine as an additive  to reduce the HF content in Sarin produced by the DF + Isopropanol method.  The US M687 howitzer shell combined a cartridge of DF with a cartridge containing a mix of 72% isopropyl alcohol and 28% isopropylamine, a ratio published in the US Army’s Field Manual 3-9. 

While isopropylamine is the amine compound of record for use in Sarin, other amines are of use for acid scavenging, including hexamine.  I found a dissertation on the usefulness of hexamine specifically as an HF scavenger , noting the ability of one molecule of hexamine to bind up to four molecules of HF.  I consulted 5 chemists and an engineer, all of whom affirmed to me that hexamine’s utility of an acid scavenger.  Hexamine can be used in binary Sarin as an acid scavenger, either on its own or in conjunction with isopropylamine.  Because this is an “off-label” use of hexamine, and one never done before, if hexamine was in the Syrian government recipe (as implied by the inventory) AND in the field samples, it is strong evidence that the 8/21 Sarin came from government inventories and was made using a unique Syrian government process. 

Of particular interest is environmental sample 25, which was taken from the screwthread of a bolt on one of the rockets.  No amount of hexamine in the ambient environment for cooking purposes could explain the presence of hexamine on this component of the actual weapon system.  There's no physical or mechanical mechanism to explain why hexamine elsewhere in the environment would get onto a screw-thread.  Hexamine on the screw thread is consistent with hexamine dissolved in the expected cocktail of substances that result from a binary reaction.

The Hypothesis Confirmed 

After working hard to confirm my suspicions about hexamine as the acid reducer in Sarin, I originally broached this idea in an article in NOW Lebanon  in early December 2013.  Somini Sengupta at the New York Times interviewed me at length, and an appropriate question was put to the OPCW in congressional hearings on 13 December 2013 .  Ms. Sengupta put forward the hexamine hypothesis in the New York Times  on 18 December 2013. I knew I was onto something serious because of the furious onslaught of trolling, threats, and general cyberbullying I received as a result of voicing the hexamine hypothesis.   Ake Sellstrom, Swedish CBRNE expert and head of the UN/OPCW inspection mission, acknowledged the role of hexamine in the following extract from Sellstrom interview  from his interview with CBRNe World magazine:
CBRNe World - Why was hexamine on the list of chemical scheduled to be destroyed - it has many other battlefield uses as well as Sarin? Did you request to put it on the list or had the Syrian’s claimed that they were using it?
Sellstrom - It is in their formula, it is their acid scavenger.
I confirmed the veracity of this statement in an email exchange with Prof. Sellstrom, although he did not provide further elaboration. This is as close as I can ever hope to a confirmation of my hexamine hypothesis, and I believe that this was one of the reasons, if not the strongest reason, that the UN firmly concluded that the 8/21 Sarin came from Syrian government stockpiles. 

The lack of compelling alternative narratives helps to reinforce the conclusion.  Other attempts to come up with a logical explanation for hexamine are based on some combination of wishful thinking, stretches in credibility, and/or faulty chemistry. 

Conclusion:

I believe the regime committed the 8/21 Sarin attack.  The following formula is a useful summation of the evidence:

Nobody’s used hexamine previously as a Sarin additive

+

There’s hexamine in the field samples

+

There’s 80 tons of hexamine in the declared inventory of the Assad Regime

+

The Syrian government’s admission to Sellstrom’s team

EQUALS

The Assad Regime Did the Wicked Deed

About the author: Dan Kaszeta is the author of “CBRN and Hazmat Incidents at Major Public Events: Planning and Response” (Wiley, 2012) as well as a number of magazine articles and conference papers.  He has 23 years of experience in CBRN, having served as an officer in the US Army Chemical Corps, as CBRN advisor for the White House Military Office, and as a specialist in the US Secret Service. He now runs Strongpoint Security, a London-based CBRN and antiterrorism consultancy. Mr. Kaszeta also holds a part-time post as Senior Research Fellow with the International Institute of Nonproliferation Studies and is a contributor to Wikistrat.


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